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ABSTRACT 
In the last two decades, the federal government of Nigeria has employed several 
strategies in an effort to resolve the ongoing crisis in its Niger Delta Region. Two main 
approaches were adopted concurrently by both military and civilian regimes within the 
period of study, diplomatic and non-diplomatic. Unfortunately, both strategies failed to 
resolve the crisis. This thesis explains why the strategies failed, arguing that combination 
of an overly high military with low civil counterinsurgency strategies during the military 
regimes of 1990–1999 allowed an excessively repressive approach that did not only fail 
to end the crisis but eventually fuelled it to transform agitation into insurgency. In 
addition, the civilian regimes of 1999–2009, which engaged low military and relatively 
high civil counterinsurgency strategies, have also not been able to resolve the crisis. 
The study hence suggests a moderate approach comprising of both strategies; a 
professional military approach with moderate civil counterinsurgency strategies, and 
adopting measures that would assist the government to isolate its counterinsurgency 
strategies from political groups’ interference, and resist responding to all pressures and 
complaints likely to sabotage its strategies. 
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 
A. IMPORTANCE................................................................................................4 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS ................................................................4 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................5 
1. Theories of Counterinsurgency ..........................................................5 
2. Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta .............................................13 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES........................................................................16 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW ...................................................................................16 
II. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 1990–1999 ........................................................19 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................19 
B. SECURITY AGENCIES ENGAGEMENTS UNDER THE 
MILITARY REGIME...................................................................................25 
C. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME .............30 
D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................34 
III. DEMOCRATIC REGIME 1999–2009.....................................................................37 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................37 
B. SECURITY AGENCY ENGAGEMENTS (1999–2009) ............................40 
C. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS UNDER OBASANJO (1999–2007)..................46 
1. Niger Delta Development Commission ............................................46 
2. National Political Reform Conference .............................................48 
D. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS UNDER YAR’ADUA (2007–2009) ..................51 
1. Delta Summit......................................................................................51 
2. Technical Committee .........................................................................53 
3. Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs.........................................................55 
4. Amnesty ..............................................................................................57 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................58 
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION............................................61 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................61 
B. SECURITY AGENCY ENGAGEMENTS..................................................61 
C. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS .............................................................................62 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................................67 
APPENDIX A.........................................................................................................................73 
APPENDIX B .........................................................................................................................81 
LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................113 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Thirty Six States of Nigeria Highlighting the Niger Delta Region....................2 
Figure 2. The Institutional Learning Cycle: The Process of Doctrinal Change ................8 
Figure 3. Area of Influence Model....................................................................................9 
Figure 4. Insurgent Origins and Flow Support Model ......................................................9 
Figure 5. Equivalent Response Model ............................................................................10 
Figure 6. Diamond Model ...............................................................................................11 
Figure 7. Desired Component Models ............................................................................11 
Figure 8. Nine States of the Niger Delta Region Nigeria................................................31 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Civil Counterinsurgency Hubs and Nodes.......................................................12 
Table 2. Historical Value of One U.S Dollar to the Nigerian Naira ..............................73 
Table 3. Timeline of the Ogoni Conflict........................................................................74 
Table 4. International Reaction to Ogoni Conflict.........................................................76 
Table 5. Key Militant Groups in the Niger Delta Region..............................................76 
Table 6. Civil Pressure Groups (Non Violent) in the Niger Delta.................................78 
Table 7. Has OMPADEC Been Able to Promote Peace, Stability, and Development 
in Oil Communities..........................................................................................80 
Table 8. Selected Cases of Abductions/Kidnapping for Ransom (2002–2003) ............81 
Table 9. Delta Violations and Reaction of the Government and that of Affected 
Communities ....................................................................................................82 
Table 10. Chronology of Attacks (2006–2008) ...............................................................82 
Table 11. Timeline of Recent Unrest in Niger Delta Region...........................................89 
Table 12. Value of Nigeria’s Average Daily Oil Production Stolen and Shut from 
2000–2008........................................................................................................93 
Table 13. Approved Nomination List for National Political Reform Conference...........94 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AIYC  All Ijaw Youth Conference 
AOR  Area of Responsibility 
AMOS  Association of Minority Oil States 
CENND Conference of Ethnic Nationalities of Niger Delta 
COIN  Counterinsurgency 
DOPCA Delta Oil Producing Communities Association 
DSOPADEC Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission 
DCR  Directorate for Citizen’s Rights 
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation 
ENC  Eastern Naval Command 
EFCC  Economic Financial Crimes Commission 
ENF  Ethnic Nationalities Forum 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zones 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
IYC  Ijaw Youth Council 
IOPASS Integrated Oil Producing Areas Security and Safety System 
JTF  Joint Task Force 
MNDA Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
MEND Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
MOSOP Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
MTC  Movement to Contact 
MNC  Multinational Corporation 
NHR  National House of Representatives 
NHRC  National Human Rights Commission 
NPRC  National Political Reform Conference 
NDCSC Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition 
NDDC  Niger Delta Development Commission 
NDEF  Niger Delta Elders Forum 
NDPVF Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force 
 xiv
NDTC  Niger Delta Technical Committee 
NDTLA Niger Delta Traditional Leaders Association 
NDV  Niger Delta Vigilante 
NDVF  Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
NAF  Nigerian Air Force 
NA  Nigerian Army 
NLC  Nigerian Labor Congress 
NN  Nigerian Navy 
NNS  Nigerian Navy Ship 
NPF  Nigerian Police Force 
OMPADEC Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
PDP  Peoples’ Democratic Party 
PNC  Peoples National Conference 
PCPR  Presidential Committee on Police Reform 
PRONACO Pro-National Conference Organizations 
PCC  Public Complaints Commission 
QFC  Quick Reaction Force 
RSISTF Rivers State Internal Security Task Force 
RSSDA Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency 
SSF  Southern Senators Forum 
SRCTRN Supreme Royal Council of Traditional Rulers in Nigeria 
UN  United Nations 




I wish to thank the entire Naval Postgraduate School staff for their assistance and 
guidance throughout the duration of my course and for making my stay memorable. I 
would like to thank the entire Dudley Knox Library staff for their cooperation, interest, 
and prompt response for materials and documents.  My deepest gratitude must go to 
Professor Letitia Lawson and Professor Scott Siegel for their invaluable guidance and 
advice as advisors of this thesis. Furthermore, I would like to express my sincere 
gratitude and thanks to the Nigerian Armed Forces for providing me the opportunity to 
attend this course in the United States of America.  
I also wish to express my immense and sincere indebtedness to my wife and kids 
without whose understanding and cooperation during the period of my studies at the 
Naval Postgraduate School, this thesis would not have been completed. Finally, I remain 
grateful to Almighty God through whom all things are possible. 
 xvi




One of the most critical responsibilities of any modern state is the sustenance of 
an environment of peace, stability and security. In developing countries, state institutions 
are often fragile, shaky, and keenly contested amongst contending interests thereby 
making this core responsibility a challenge. Without security, not only do individuals find 
it difficult to engage in productive activities, states are bound to experience great 
difficulty in harnessing their human and material resources towards meaningful 
development.1   
The possible failure of such states brings many more complications including 
marginalization of some groups, new security threats and political oppression whether 
real or perceived.  Most states in Africa confront these kinds of complications flowing 
from the inability of weak states to provide adequate peace, stability and security. 
Nigeria, the continent’s most populated country, has recently experienced widespread 
waves of violent conflicts. These conflicts have been attributed to ethnicity, religion, 
poverty, politics and uneven distribution of economic resources. Such conflicts pose 
threats to the security of Nigerian citizens, as well as the Nigerian government. Due to 
the conflicts, lives and property have been lost with dire consequences for Nigeria’s 
development and feed serious security threats. By far, the most serious of these violent 
conflicts has been the one in the Niger Delta region. 
Oil was first discovered in Nigeria in 1956 in Oloibiri Village, Bayelsa State, in 
the Niger Delta region (Figure 1).2 Since then, Nigeria has increased its oil and gas 
reserves through exploration to become Africa’s largest and the world’s seventh largest 
producer of crude oil and natural gas. According to the 2005 Annual Report of Nigeria’s 
Federal Office of Statistics, oil and natural gas account for about 90 percent of Nigeria’s 
                                                 
1 T. Akindele, “Theory and Practice of Crises,” (Lecture delivered at the National War College, Abuja, 
Nigeria, to Participants of Course 13, May 19, 2005), 34–35. 
2 U. Etiosa and A. Mathew, “Coping With Climate Change and Environmental Degradation in Niger 
Delta Region of Southern Nigeri,” (A paper presented at the Community Research and Development 
Centre, Benin, Nigeria, May 16, 2002), 2. 
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export income3 for the past three decades. The importance of these two mineral 
resources, concentrated in the Niger Delta region of the country, cannot be 
overemphasized. 
 
Figure 1.   Thirty Six States of Nigeria Highlighting the Niger Delta Region4 
Due to the vast resources in this area, many government agencies, private 
establishments and multinational maritime organizations are located there. Because the 
exploration and exploitation activities of transnational oil companies occasionally result 
in spillages and environmental degradation, mobilization in the region for environmental 
protection and greater local control of resources has evolved. The ongoing conflict in the 
                                                 
3 Syndicate 4, “NN Role in Securing Nigeria’s Offshore Assets and Resources: Problems and 
Prospects,” (A symposium paper presented to DMW Armed Forces Command and Staff College Nigeria, 
January 23, 2008), 8. 
4 Adam Groves, “Shell and Society: Securing the Niger Delta,” International Relations, accessed July 
8, 2010, http://www.e-ir.info/wp-content/uploads/nigeria-map.png. 
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Niger Delta is attributed to poverty, corruption, ethnic conflicts and unemployment.5 The 
main grievances and demands in the region include: 
1. Environmental degradation 
2. Marginalization 
3. Redistribution of oil revenue 
3. Political autonomy  
4. Control of local resources 
In recent years, armed groups increasingly have targeted the oil industry, reducing 
oil production by as much as 20 percent of production capacity through pipeline 
vandalism, sabotage, illegal oil bunkering, and kidnapping.  These activities have been 
directed at oilrigs, pipelines, storage tanks, flow stations, loading points, and jetties, as 
well as refineries.6 Over the years, the government has acted against perceived internal 
threats to the oil industry by mobilizing its security agencies to deter the sabotage of oil 
installations and generally protect the production environment for the oil companies. It 
also introduced social development programs and other government sponsored 
developmental initiatives aimed at eroding insurgency support within the region.7 
However, these efforts have met with minimal success.  Why has the Nigerian 
government been unable to contain and eliminate these threats to its vital economic and 
security interest to date? How can it improve its effectiveness? 
 
 
                                                 
5 Capt (NN) K.L. Olofinmoyin, “Conflict in the Oil producing Area of Nigeria: Implication for 
National security,” National War College Paper Nigeria, April 6, 1998, 27. 
6 Nnoli Okuwadiba Nnoli, Ethnic Conflicts in Niger Delta: A Comparative Analysis, (Nottingham: 
Russell Press, 1998), 1. 
7 World News, “Nigeria begins amnesty for Niger Delta militants,” guardian.uk, August 6, 2009, 




Nigeria relies upon oil for its economic survival.8 Oil has also become the main 
contributor to the capacity of the nation’s security. Therefore, any threat to the oil sector 
is a direct blow to the heart of the country capable of having a devastating effect on the 
nation’s economy and security.9  
While protection of Nigeria’s oil industry would appear to be an economic issue, 
the instability in the oil sector has serious implications for the security of the nation.10 
Therefore, the protection of this industry and its associated network and facilities is of 
utmost importance to Nigeria.  More importantly, Nigeria’s dependence on oil as the 
principal source of national revenue underscores the country’s structure of instability, 
which makes the problem an urgent issue for research and policy attention. 
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Various factors contribute to the failure to contain the disruptions in the Nigerian 
oil market. While many of these are well understood, little attention has been paid to 
political influence in response to the conflict or to the strategies the Nigerian government 
has adopted to resolve it. This study will partly fill this gap. Under the military regime 
period, political influence was minimal and excessive military counterinsurgency effort 
was used to resolve the crisis with little or no civil counterinsurgency effort.  Under the 
subsequent democratic administration, political pressure from Niger Delta politicians led 
to minimal military counterinsurgency efforts and increased civil counterinsurgency 
efforts. This thesis will argue that the strategies adopted failed to resolve the crisis during 
either period because of the level of political influence; it was too low under the military 
regime as a result of low civil and excessive military engagements, and has been overly 
high under the democratic regime resulting in very high civil and low military 
                                                 
8 L. Atakpu, “Resource-Based Conflicts: Challenges of Oil Extraction in Nigeria,” (Paper presented at 
the African Network for Environment and Economic Justice, Benin, Nigeria, March 29, 2007), 1. 
9 Su Umosen, “Security Situation in the Niger Delta,” (Brief to the CNS at NHQ, Abuja, Nigeria, 
November 18, 2005), 1. 
10 Ibid., 2. 
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engagements. During the democratic dispensation, pressure groups both from inside and 
outside the Niger Delta region stalled government efforts to take decisive action in 
resolving the conflict at the state and national levels. Other political groups, again mostly 
indigenous groups within the Niger Delta region with substantial support of their people, 
used other forms of political pressure such as the media and propaganda to influence 
government decisions on the Niger Delta issue. Therefore, for this research, pressure 
group activity will be the independent variable, and government strategy will be the 
intervening variable. The hypothesis is that the absence of political pressure during the 
military regime (1990–1999) led to an overly aggressive military response, while during 
the democratic regime (1999–2009) political pressure at local, state and national levels 
led to an overly cautious military response. The study will consider agitation to be any 
action that is intended to stimulate public feeling, interest, movement or support for or 
against a matter of controversy such as a political or social issue. While insurgency will 
be considered as a protracted violent conflict in which one or more groups uses political 
resources and violence in an effort to fundamentally change the political or social 
arrangement in a state or region and reformulate the basis of legitimacy of one or more 
aspects of politics.11 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Theories of Counterinsurgency 
There is a consensus in the literature that insurgency is one of the most difficult 
challenges for a state to overcome, and that the end state of any strategy adopted by a 
government is “to separate the insurgents from their popular support base and neutralize 
them through social, political, economic, and military actions that reduce their grievance 
 
                                                 
11 R. Scott Moore, The Basics of Counterinsurgency, accessed September 8, 2007, Small Wars 
Journal: http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/moorecoinpaper.pdf; O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: 
From Revolution to Apocalypse, (Washington D.C:  Potomac Books, Inc 2005), from Gordon H. Bradley, 
“Framework for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices,” Naval Postgraduate School, Lecture Notes 
Part 4 OS3640, 20–21. 
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or kill the insurgent leadership, thereby ending the threat.”12 There is a debate about the 
factors that determine a state’s counterinsurgency effectiveness. One camp argues that the 
key factor is strategic design, while another argues that the key factor is strategic 
implementation. 
Bottiglieri, representing the first camp, notes that there are three main operational 
approaches to counterinsurgency: direct, outside-in, and inside-out.13 The direct method 
involves the employment of military forces to engage insurgents using conventional 
tactics. A government deploys its military forces in areas where insurgents are operating 
to carry out search and destroy operations. This approach is best suited to situations in 
which insurgents are well organized, have some form of support, and are able to control 
territory and establish fixed bases of operation, but lack substantial popular support. The 
outside-in approach involves attacking the outlying borders of the insurgency and 
working towards the center. This approach is applied where the insurgency has 
considerable popular support. The government adopts strategies such as “winning the 
hearts and minds,” and political and economic concessions, geared towards separating the 
insurgency from its popular support. The inside-out approach involves attacking 
insurgent leadership, then working down through lower levels of command until the 
group’s coherence is lost. This approach is used against insurgencies with political and 
ideological grievances closely identified with its leadership. The logic of this approach is 
that when there is no leadership, followers will lose the will to fight.14  
                                                 
12 Edward Novack, “Criminals and Insurgents: The Role of Ethnicity in State Response to Internal 
Resource Competitors,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2007), 9; John A. Nagl, 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Publishing, 2005); Eric P. Wendt Lt.Col, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” Special 
Warfare, ‘Counterinsurgency: Achieving Popular Support, 18:2, (September 2005); David C. Gompert et 
al., “Reconstruction under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency,” RAND Corporation 
(2009), accessed January 16, 2010, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG870; William Rosenau and 
Austin Long, “The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency,” National Defense Research 
Institute, RAND Corporation (2009), accessed January 16, 2010, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP258. 
13 Michael A. Bottiglieri, “How to Defeat Insurgencies: Searching for a Counter-Insurgency Strategy,” 
(Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 2000), 4–5. 
14 Michael A. Bottiglieri, “How to Defeat Insurgencies: Searching for a Counter-Insurgency Strategy,” 
(Naval Postgraduate School: Master’s Thesis, December 2000), 4–6. 
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The question for the strategic design camp is why governments and their security 
forces fail to adopt the most effective approach, and/or do not adjust their approach in the 
light of learning on the ground. Nagl, for instance, highlights how organizational culture 
of the state and its armed forces affects their ability to learn from unforeseen conditions, 
based on his study of the success and failure of the British and Americans in Malaya 
(1948–60) and Vietnam (1950–75), respectively.15 He argues that the British successfully 
adopted the conventional doctrine of organizational learning cycle (Figure 2) in 
combination with flexibility, good leadership with a strategic vision, intelligence, and 
past experience to produce a strategic design that was effective in Malaya. On the other 
hand, Nagl argues that the Americans failed to produce the appropriate strategic design in 
Vietnam, and thus failed, due to a strong institutional culture favoring the use of fire 
power and maneuver, to engage the enemy. The Americans failed to accept that their 
superior weapons, technology and organization could not even find the enemy, talk less 
of destroying it, and this cognitive dissonance was a major factor in their failure.16 
                                                 
15  John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 190–197. 
16 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 198–199; Andrews, R. W, The village war: Vietnamese 
communist revolutionary activities in Dinh Tuong province, 1960–1964 (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 1973); Galula, D, Counterinsurgency warfare theory and practice, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger 
Security International 1964); Grubbs Lee and Michael Forsyth, "Is There a Deep Fight in 











Figure 2.   The Institutional Learning Cycle: The Process of Doctrinal Change17 
The strategic implementation camp highlights the efficient use of available 
resources as the key explanatory factor in counterinsurgency success or failure. Wendt 
studies five models of counterinsurgency, arguing that counterinsurgency success 
depends on operational efficiency or using minimum resources required for maximum 
success. In his “area of influence” model, the support of the local populace is acquired 
using “sticks and carrots” in a way similar to moving the bubble on a level.18 The 
government’s challenge is find the correct proportion of sticks and carrots to convince the 
populace to expose the insurgents who will then be either captured or killed (Figure 3).19 
The “insurgent origins and flow of support” model suggests that attacking active 
insurgent groups, which is the conventional approach, is less effective than attacking the 
                                                 
17 Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 193. 
18 Lt Col Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 3. 
19 Ibid., 3. 
Individual Action/ 



















members that form the insurgent infrastructure (Figure 4).20 The “equivalent response” 
model proposes using equal quality and intensity of violence in countering the insurgency 
laying emphasis on a band of excellence with a maximum and minimum boundary within 
which the counterinsurgency effort must stay (Figure 5).21  
 
 
Figure 3.   Area of Influence Model22 
 
 
Figure 4.   Insurgent Origins and Flow Support Model23 
                                                 
20 Lt Col Eric P. Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 3–4. 
21 Ibid., 4–5. 
22 Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 3. 
23 Ibid., 4. 
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Figure 5.   Equivalent Response Model24 
The “McCormick diamond model” involves building government’s legitimacy 
and control of the population while lowering that of the insurgents, and building 
legitimacy in the eyes of international actors while reducing or destroying the insurgent’s 
external support (Figure 6).25 Wendt’s last model requires three “desired components” 
for a successful counterinsurgency operation: a constabulary made up of Special Forces, 
a Quick Reaction Force (QRF), and Movement to Contact (MTC) force (Figure 7).26 The 
study argues that applying all five models simultaneously is the most effective approach 
to counterinsurgency, and that the more models are applied, the more likely the 
counterinsurgency effort is to be successful. 
                                                 
24 Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 5. 
25 Ibid., 5–6. 
26 Ibid., 7–8. 
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Figure 6.   Diamond Model27 
 
Figure 7.   Desired Component Models28 
Gompert et al. focuses more specifically on the relative timing of implementation 
of civil and military counterinsurgency initiatives. They note that civil counterinsurgency 
is usually disrupted by insurgent threats and security risks causing its postponement, 
thereby increasing reliance on the use of force (military counterinsurgency) until the 
                                                 
27 Wendt, “Strategic Counterinsurgency Modeling,” 6. 
28 Ibid., 7. 
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territory is free of insurgency, before resuming to civil counterinsurgency.29 They argue 
that the simultaneous implementation is more effective in ending insurgency, and can be 
achieved by improving security in the area of insurgency to allow for civil 
counterinsurgency (human services, political reform, physical reconstruction, economic 
development, and indigenous capacity building) before insurgent threats have been 
eliminated. They maintain that this is critical to success because civil counterinsurgency 
during active insurgency helps win the hearts and minds of the local populace and turn 
them against the insurgents, making the overall counterinsurgency efforts more effective 
(combination of military and civil tools).30 
To secure these civil counterinsurgency activities, Gompert et al. recommends 
prioritizing civil counterinsurgency activities, making a basis for allocating security 
forces and mixing civil counterinsurgency staff with military personnel. They also 
recommended setting up networks consisting of nodes and hubs, then linking their 
movements (Appendix A, Table 1), integrating and collocating these networks with 
security measures (securing all hubs and nodes and movements among them), thereby 
reducing the risk and vulnerability of civil counterinsurgency efforts to insurgent 
threats.31 
Table 1.   Civil Counterinsurgency Hubs and Nodes32 
Sector             Hubs         Nodes 
Health     Hospitals, medical training Clinics     
Government administration   Provincial                District and municipal  
Education    Secondary, teacher training  Primary, adult   
Justice     Superior courts, prisons   Lower courts, jails   
                                                 
29 Gompert et al., Reconstruction under Fire, 10–16. 
30 Ibid., 62–70. 
31 Gompert et al., Reconstruction under Fire, 74; Gompert, David. C and John Gordon IV, “War by 
other means: building complete and balanced capabilities for counterinsurgency,” National Defense 
Research Institute RAND, (2008), 76–77; Zaalberg W. Thijs Brocades, Soldiers and civil power: 
supporting or substituting civil authorities in modern peace operations, (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2006). 
32 Gompert, et al., Reconstruction under Fire, 74. 
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Finance     State and large banks   Branches and micro-lenders 
Telecommunications   Central switches    Towers    
Markets     Wholesale, international   Retail, local   
Enterprise    Large, heavy    Small, light   
Construction    Equipment procurement   Site work    
Electricity    Power generation                    Users    
The strategic design and implementation camps both provide useful frameworks 
for studying the Niger Delta case. However, neither goes far enough in considering 
explanations of why governments and security agencies fail to adopt appropriate designs 
and/or implementation strategies and why they fail to adjust design and/or 
implementation in light of learning. Organizational culture is a plausible explanation for 
strategic design failures, but there are other potential constraints on design adjustment. 
Similarly, Wendt’s insights into how to maximize the efficiency of strategic 
implementation, Rosenau et al.’s combined civil/military counterinsurgency style 
(discussed below), and Gompert et al.’s civil military insight are all useful, but do not 
pinpoint why governments do not implement such strategies in the light of feedback from 
initial efforts. Here again, organizational culture is a plausible explanation, but not the 
only possible one. 
2. Counterinsurgency in the Niger Delta 
Most of the research on the Niger Delta conflict has been on the causes of the 
insurgency, rather than the effectiveness of counterinsurgency efforts.33  Most broadly, 
scholars point to the lack of national integration, inter-group antagonism, lack of 
 
                                                 
33 M. A. Muye, “Protection of Oil Installations in Nigeria and its Implications on National Security,” 
Armed Forces Command and Staff College Nigeria, (College Paper, SC 30, 2008), 94; Osahor MC, quoted 
in Adeniyi PS, “Deep Sea Oil Exploitation: Security Implications to Nigeria,” (Paper delivered at the 
CONSAC 2006 at Offa, Kwara State, Nigeria, on 8 March 2006), 11; AE Ekoku and MA Vogt, Nigeria 
Defence Policy: Issues and Problems, (Lagos: Malt House Press, 1990), 224. 
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economic development, and socio-economic disparities as the underlying factors.34 
Focusing on the economic dynamics of resource-induced conflicts, Oyefusi argues that 
oil-dependence led to civil conflict in Nigeria through two major mechanisms: political 
struggles over oil revenue allocation at the national level and the Niger Delta conflicts.35 
However, Oyefusi does not address the links between these two mechanisms, and thus 
does not touch upon the politics of counterinsurgency. Instead, he links the Niger Delta 
crisis to weak institutional arrangements, deficiency in enforcement, an ineffective 
security system, a mix of interest between states and oil companies resulting in 
oppressive measures on communities by states during dispute situations, looting, and rent 
seeking competition within local members, amongst others, without addressing the 
deeper roots of these factors.36  
In other research, Oyefusi argues that individual level factors (low income, low 
literacy, lack of assets and absence of marital engagement) increase the tendency of 
people to take up arms, and that most of these factors can be addressed through a 
combination of economic policies and effective counterinsurgency presence in all parts of 
the region.37 Onasoga identifies the lack of social amenities, operation of oil companies 
below the acceptable international standard of environmental safety (including gas 
flaring), political dominance, marginalization or economic deprivation, and the 
inadequacies of the country’s police force to secure life and properties of the citizens as 
contributing factors to insurgency.38 All three studies make reasonable recommendations 
                                                 
34 Aprezi A.F.K, “Threats to Internal Security in the Niger Delta: Challenges for the Nigerian Armed 
Forces,” (National War College Nigeria, Research Paper June 2000), 24; Kasfir N, “The Shrinking Political 
Arena,” quoted in Yakubu AM, Crisis and Conflict Management in Nigeria Since 1980, Volume One 
Causes and Dimensions of Conflict, (Kaduna: Nigerian Defence Academy, 2005); Imobighe TA, 
“Introduction: Civil Society, Ethnic Nationalism and Nation Building in Nigeria,” Civil Society and Ethnic 
Conflict Management in Nigeria, ed. Imobighe, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd, 2003); Suberu RT, Ethnic 
Minority conflicts and Governance in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1996). 
35 Aderoju Oyefusi, “Oil-dependence and Civil Conflict in Nigeria,” The Centre for the Study of 
African Economies Working Paper Series, Centre for the Study of African Economies, 268: (2007), 1–3. 
36 Oyefusi, “Oil-dependence,” 5–12. 
37 Aderoju Oyefusi, “Oil and the Propensity to Armed Struggle in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” 
Post-Conflict Transitions Working Paper No. 8, World Bank Policy Working Paper 4194, (April 2007), 1–
4. 
38 Onasoga AK, “Effects of Ethnic Militia on National Security,” (Armed Forces Command and Staff 
College Nigeria, College Paper SC 28, 2006), 75–76. 
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about counterinsurgency policies based on their assessment of the causes of the 
insurgency, but fail to consider how politics constrains counterinsurgency design and 
implementation. 
Looking at the Niger Delta conflict from an international perspective, Rosenau et 
al. examine efforts by multinational corporations (MNC) to end violence and promote 
stability through social development and security measures, which they call “Corporate 
Counterinsurgency.”39 They argue that Shell Nigeria’s adoption of a range of measures 
including social development were ineffective because some of the communities in the 
region felt marginalized over development projects, distribution of social funds, and 
employment slots offered by the MNCs causing an increase in conflicts rather than 
reducing them.40 Overall, this study highlights how MNCs could have been used to 
reduce insurgency but that they did not consider the politics of the Nigerian government’s 
management of the MNCs, which resulted in the failure of the MNC’s counterinsurgency 
measures in the Niger Delta. 
This study will begin to fill the gap identified in both theoretical and case specific 
literature by exploring the politics of strategic design and implementation. Its findings 
will advance understanding of how politics have affected strategic design and 
implementation by the Nigerian democratic administration on the Niger Delta crisis and 
the implications of this for national security. It will identify appropriate reforms to the 
policy process in light of these findings, and suggest options which the government could 
adopt in the formulation of policies towards implementing an effective strategy for 
improving the security and development of Nigeria’s oil industry. However, the 
implementation of these reforms and recommendations will be constrained by the very 
political processes the thesis highlights. 
                                                 
39 William Rosenau et al., “Corporations and Counterinsurgency,” National Security Research 
Division, RAND Corporation (2009), accessed January 16, 2009, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP259, 1–4. 
40 Rosenau et al., “Corporations and Counterinsurgency,” 9–16. 
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D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research uses process tracing and a within case comparison. It will analyze 
the Nigerian government’s responses to the Delta region’s instability during military 
(1990–1998), and democratic regimes (1999–2009), showing how the presence of politics 
at local, state, and national levels has either limited the government’s ability to adopt and 
implement an effective strategy or how its absence allowed adoption of extreme measures 
to resolve the conflict. Furthermore, the study will be limited to analyzing strategies and 
policies adopted by the Nigerian central government; strategies, initiatives and policies 
implemented by states will not be considered. The study will consider security force and 
political efforts in relation to the rise or decline of conflicts in the Niger Delta within 
these regimes. Political efforts to be highlighted will include influence of public opinion 
through propaganda, organization appointment implementation, and pressures within 
pressure groups on disapproval of certain government actions for settling the crisis. 
Although the political activity indicates that the democratic process is working better than 
often acknowledged in Nigeria, this study will point out how the same process limits 
government response to resolving the Delta crisis. Data collection will be mostly 
qualitative, relying heavily on Nigerian news outlets. The sources are supplemented by 
discussions with security officers who participated in internal security operations in the 
Niger Delta, as well as secondary sources.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. After the first introductory chapter, 
Chapter II will examine the military regime period (1990–1998), while Chapter III 
examines the democratic regime (1999–2009) highlighting how the level of political 
pressure affected the design and implementation of counterinsurgency strategies.  
Chapter IV will be an analysis of the effectiveness of the strategies discussed in 
chapters two and three; the non-democratic regime’s high military and low civil 
engagement, and the democratic regime’s low military and high civil engagements, in 
order to understand why both strategies failed. It will then draw together insights of the 
preceding chapter, showing how political pressure has affected the democratic 
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administration’s design and implementation of strategies resulting in weaker strategies at 
the military and diplomatic levels contributing to failure to resolve the crisis. It will also 
offer recommendations on how the Nigerian government could reduce or possibly 
eliminate political interference on its strategic design and implementation capabilities and 
hopefully provide the way forward for the Nigerian government for resolving the Niger 
Delta conflict. 
 18
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II. MILITARY ADMINISTRATION 1990–1999 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes the strategy for the Delta region by the Nigerian military 
governments of 1990–1999, which relied heavily upon deployment of law enforcement 
agents and the military to suppress agitators and enforce order. It explains why COIN 
strategies failed during military regimes, highlighting how Nigerian governments’ 
repressive measures with little or no civil engagement not only failed to contain or reduce 
agitation, but aggravated what had been a political conflict in the early 1990s into a 
violent one by the end of the decade. Due to their over reliance on the use of force 
(military COIN), military regime’s approach highlights the hypothesis of Gompert et al., 
however, their failure to resume to civil COIN after suppression of agitation ignoring all 
civic pressure group demands made it ineffective. 
Poorly trained police and military sometimes killed innocent civilians, provoking 
further mobilization by Delta civil society groups, which were then also repressed, 
attracting international sympathy to the cause of those agitators.41  At the same time, 
agitators, mainly the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and Ijaw 
Youth Council (IYC), exaggerated claims of violent oppression by the state in order to 
push security forces out of the region and justify their own adoption of increasingly 
violent tactics. However, this had little effect as the military administrations were 
impervious to political pressure coupled with the fact that both MOSOP and IYC were 
non-violent groups at this time. This differentiated the MOSOP and IYC from other non-
violent political groups because they transformed and became violent while others 
remained non-violent. This chapter shows how the near absence of effective political 
                                                 
41 Human Rights Watch, “The Ogoni Crisis: A Case-Study of Military Repression in Southeastern 
Nigeria,” UNHCR, July 1, 1995, accessed July 18, 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a7d8c.html; Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 
“Nigeria: The conflict between Itsekiri and Ijaw ethnic groups in Warri, Delta region,” NGA32676.E: 
(March 1997–September 14, 1999), accessed July 18, 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ad6864.html. 
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influence42 from the Niger Delta on security strategy during the 1990s led to the 
maintenance of the government’s overly repressive approach, low levels of civil 
engagement by the government, and failure to contain the insurgency.  This failure 
contributed to the turn to violence by MOSOP and IYC beginning in 1998. 
The percentage of oil revenue allocated to the Niger Delta was at its lowest level 
during the 1990s.  It had been reduced from 50 percent to 45 percent by the Distributable 
Pool Account Decree of 1970, then to five percent by the 1979 Constitution, as oil 
revenue had grown dramatically, from a marginal contributor to public finance in 1970 to 
virtually the only source of public finance by the end of the decade. By the time General 
Babangida assumed power in 1985, it had been reduced to a two percent sharing 
arrangement.  Babangida created the Presidential Task Force for the Development of Oil 
Producing Areas in 1985, allocating 1.5 percent of oil revenues for development of oil 
producing areas, but then cut the general revenue share from two percent to one percent. 
Later on, allocation to mineral producing areas was increased to three percent but 
returned to one percent less than six months later, where it remained until the 1999 
Constitution increased it to 13 percent where it remains to date.43 The depreciation of the 
Nigerian Naira against the U.S. dollar throughout these years (Appendix A, Table 1) was 
to have cushioned the impact of the reduction, but inflation wiped out the anticipated 
cushioning effect.44  This systematic stripping of the proceeds of oil produced in the 
Delta region eventually provoked agitation for a reversal. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Non violent pressure groups of the Niger Delta could not influence strategies adopted by the 
government in the region because of the autocratic nature of the military administrations of that period.  
43 Ilufoye Sarafa Ogundiya, “Domestic Terrorism and Security Threats in the Niger Delta Region of 
Nigeria,” Journal of Social Science 20 (2009), 38; Emmanuel M. Akpabio, and Nseabasi S. Akpan, 
“Governance and Oil Politics in Nigeria’s Niger Delta: The Question Of Distributive Equity,” Department 
of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Uyo Nigeria (2010), accessed July 22, 2010, 
http://www.krepublishers.com/02 Journals/JHE/JHE-30. 
44 Timeline Results for Naira Dollar Exchange Rate History 1970–2010, accessed August 23, 2010, 
http://www.google.com/search?q=naira+dollar+ exchange+rate+history. 
 21
The Niger Delta struggle started with agitation by small groups of people 
organizing minor demonstrations. This grew into intermittent agitation by larger groups 
over environmental degradation and/or resource distribution issues during the 1970s and 
1980s, before insurgency began to gather in the late 1990s.45 
The first significant mobilization was the February 1966 “12 Day War,” led by 
Isaac Adaka Boro, who formed a small armed militia, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force 
(NDVF), to protest against political and economic marginalization and demand a fairer 
share of oil wealth.46 When its demands were ignored, Boro’s group declared the 
southern part of the Niger Delta the independent “Niger Delta Peoples Republic.”47 
However, there was little local political mobilization in support of the movement or 
engagement with the government’s response to it. In 1966, government revenue was 
generated largely from indirect taxes on cash crops grown in other parts of Nigeria (palm 
oil and cocoa in the south west, and groundnut/peanuts in the north), which meant that 
the Delta actually received more revenue from the federal government than it generated 
for it, even with only 50 percent of oil revenues returning to the Delta.48 Thus, agitation 
for regions to keep a greater percentage of their income generation would not have 
benefited the Delta.  This likely explains the lack of political mobilization in response to 
Boro’s cause. The movement was squelched, its supporters arrested and jailed with no 
response from the Niger Delta people.49 (Thirty years later, however, activist scholars, 
such as Saro Wiwa, and the leaders of the Association of Minority Oil States [AMOS], 
political, and insurgent groups, such as AMOS, MOSOP, IYC, and Movement for the 
                                                 
45 Akinyele R.T., “States Creation in Nigeria: The Willink’s Report in Retrospect,” African Studies 
Review, 39:2, (September 1996), 71–94. 
46 Courson, Elias, "The burden of Oil: Social Deprivation and Political Militancy in Gbaramatu Clan, 
Warri South West LGA Delta State, Nigeria," Institute of International Studies, Working Paper No. 15 
(Berkley: University of California, USA 2007), accessed September 9, 2010, 
http://geography.berkeley.edu/ProjectsResources/ND%20Website/NigerDelta/WP/15-Courson.pdf. 
47 Ilufoye Ogundiya, "Domestic Terrorism and Security,” 34. 
48 Solomon C. Madubuike, “Ethnic Conflicts: Social Identity and Resources Control Agitations in the 
Niger Delta,” Sociology Department, Bowen University, Iwo, Osun State, Nigeria, accessed September 15, 
2010, http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/Solomon, 11. 
49 Asoya Sylvester, “From Adaka Boro to Henry Okah,” The News, June 30, 2008, accessed July 17, 
2010, http://thenewsng.com/cover-story/from-adaka-boro-to-henry-okah/2008/06. 
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Emancipation of the Niger Delta [MEND], would revive the incident, and memories of 
Isaac Boro himself as a martyr, for purposes of mobilizing support for the cause.)50  
After a decade long gap, in the late 1970s, Niger Delta civil society groups again 
started minor agitation over the equity of resource distribution in response to the rapid 
growth of oil revenue, and the reduction in the percentage allocated to the region. The 
group AMOS, mostly made up of young academicians (university lecturers, graduates, 
and students), emerged with a peaceful academic approach, claiming that the principle of 
equity was neglected in support of other considerations in distributing the country’s 
resources, which did not favor the Delta community. The group AMOS therefore 
demanded an equitable formula for sharing oil revenues through consultations and 
negotiations with stake holders, including multinational oil companies, and federal and 
state governments. The military government paid no attention to AMOS’ grievances.  
There was no significant political mobilization behind AMOS, and no significant 
response against the government strategy of firm action.  Again, a struggle against the 
government was easily suppressed.51 
After several years of calm, agitation returned, and this time escalated into 
insurgency, after the government adopted even more repressive measures against 
agitators leaving them with no option of showing their grievances apart from resorting to 
violence. In 1990, Ken Saro Wiwa founded the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), which remained the only active organization until near the end of the 
military regime.  The short period of transition to democratic governance (1998–1999) 
then saw a proliferation of similar, but more clearly insurgent, organizations. Saro 
Wiwa’s international environmental strategy was successful in bringing the Niger Delta 
into the international limelight, which in turn increased MOSOP’s membership and the 
                                                 
50  See for example a Niger Delta agitation website dedicated to Boro at; Youpele Banigo, “Isaac 
Adaka Boro,” Bayelsa State Union of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, July 2005, accessed February 25, 
2010, http://www.google.com/imgres?imgurl=http://www.bayelsa.org.uk; Isaac Boro J.A, Twelve Day 
Revolution, Edited by Tony Tabekaemi,  accessed February 25, 2010, 
http://www.adakaboro.org/the12dayrev; Adaka Boro Center, “Documenting the Niger Delta Struggle,” 
accessed February 25, 2010, http://www.adakaboro.org/. The official Niger Delta Struggle website is 
named Adaka Boro Center. 
51 Ilufoye Ogundiya, "Domestic Terrorism and Security,” 35. 
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group’s agitation. As a former president of the Association of Nigerian Writers, Saro 
Wiwa had access to many of his colleagues abroad and used them to publicize the Ogoni 
struggle through journals, news, reports, and some of his own publications. His two 
books, and his prison diary, smuggled to his friend William Boyd in England and made 
available to the international media by mobilizing PEN (an organization that campaigns 
for release of writers detained for the power of their writing), further aroused 
international awareness of the Niger Delta situation.52 Wiwa’s first self published book 
Sozaboy (Soldier Boy), focused on arming the minds of the Ogonis and rejuvenating their 
pride, contributed to increasing agitation by Ogonis as well as encouraging other ethnic 
groups in the region to mobilize.53 Nevertheless, the MOSOP remained the most 
prominent group.  Its strategy included large marches and demonstrations to highlight 
what it saw as unfair distribution of oil revenues, underdevelopment in the region, and 
environmental devastation caused by operations of multinational petroleum industries, all 
of which undermined local livelihoods.54 The MOSOP adopted an Ogoni Bill of Rights 
in 1990 agitating against oil-related suffering of the Ogoni people, government neglect, 
lack of social services, and political marginalization. Demands of the bill included 
political autonomy to participate in the affairs of the country as a distinct and separate 
unit to guarantee political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people, the right to control 
and use a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development, adequate 
representations of Ogoni people in all Nigerian national institutions, and the right to 
protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.55 In response, 
President Babangida issued Decree No 21 in May 1992, which banned MOSOP and other 
Delta associations. However, this did not end MOSOP activities. 
On January 4, 1993, MOSOP staged a march of 300,000 declaring the day as 
Ogoni Day in commemoration of the declaration of 1993 as the International Year of the 
                                                 
52 Phil Jenkins, “Nigerian Writer Treated Shamefully,” The Ottawa Citizen, April 9, 1995, accessed 
August 21, 2010, http://www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic/. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ogundiya, “Domestic Terrorism and Security,” 35; AMOS was eventually banned alongside other 
sectional political groups under Decree 21 of 1992. 
55 Ogoni Bill of Rights, “Presented to the Government and People of Nigeria,” November 1990, 
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World’s Indigenous People; the march was also a protest against Shell Oil Company 
activities and the environmental destruction of Ogoni land. Several other protests were 
staged at oil company offices throughout 1993 (Appendix A, Table 2).  Once again 
responding to the growing agitation by MOSOP, the Nigerian government passed the 
Treasonable Offences Law in May 1993, imposing the death penalty on supporters of 
ethnic autonomy who connive with groups within or outside the country to threaten the 
sovereignty of Nigeria.56 Nonetheless, in June 1993, MOSOP boycotted the presidential 
elections, the first time a Niger Delta civic organization inserted its grievances into 
national political discourse.57 The banning of ethnic based secessionist groups in the 
region reduced the possibility of pressure groups materializing to press for change of 
government strategy. Traditional leaders in the region became further marginalized, 
viewed as traitors who accepted pleasantries from the government, because they failed to 
stress on government’s repressive strategies on behalf of their people, thus they became 
targets of violent youthful activists. This situation resulted into the murder of four 
traditional leaders by youth activists in 1994. Saro Wiwa and eight other MOSOP leaders 
were arrested, charged, convicted, and executed for allegedly instigating the murder of 
the four traditional authorities in 1995.  Subsequently, the executions created a leadership 
vacuum in which Delta communities supported any leader who would fight for their 
rights. Protestors/demonstrators became much more violent, picking up arms, conducting 
insurgent activities, kidnapping, and becoming involved in illegal oil bunkering to fund 
their activities.  By 1996 agitation was giving way to insurgency. 
                                                 
56 Dokubo Charles, “Ethnic Minority Problems in the Niger Delta,” accessed July 8, 2010, 
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Rights news, actions, announcements, opinions and miscellanea,” accessed March 1, 2010, 
http://www.humanrightsblog. org/2009/06/shell_settles_saro_wiwa_lawsui.html. 
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B. SECURITY AGENCIES ENGAGEMENTS UNDER THE MILITARY 
REGIME 
This portion of the chapter assesses operations by the Nigerian Police Force 
(NPF), Nigerian Navy (NN), Nigerian Army (NA), and Nigerian Air Force (NAF) to 
show that military engagements far outweighed civil engagements that the specific 
strategies adopted reflected the absence of input by political actors inside and outside 
government, and that these operations faltered as a result. 
The Nigerian Police Force (NPF) was tasked to maintain peace and order during 
the early stages of the struggle in the early 1990s which involved protests and 
demonstrations, with support from the military as needed. However, the NPF became 
overwhelmed when MOSOP agitation and protests escalated, as protestors/demonstrators 
became more violent, picking up arms, conducting insurgent activities, kidnapping, and 
becoming involved in illegal oil bunkering to fund their activities.58 The police force’s 
inability to contain the emerging insurgency was attributable to shortage of manpower, 
inadequate equipment and skills, inflow of illegal arms to the militants, insufficient 
funding, and most importantly lack of discipline and corruption, leading to loss of 
confidence in the police by the public.59 Many of these weaknesses could have been 
addressed by the government, but instead the military administrations were inclined to 
shift responsibility for maintaining law and order to the military, and invest instead in its 





                                                 
58 Agbonifo John, “Oil, Insecurity, and Subversive Patriots in the Niger Delta: The Ogoni as Agent of 
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Command and Staff College Nigeria, 2008). 
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compensate for government neglect of the police, attempting to purchase arms for NPF 
forces attached to its facilities, as well as provide funding; this was revealed after one of 
Shell’s arms suppliers sued Shell for breach of contract.61 
The rules of engagement required use of minimum force to achieve the mission, 
but security forces systematically unleashed maximum violence. They also illegally 
arrested, detained, and tortured innocent people, and raped women in the name of 
maintaining law and order. Their actions were counterproductive to achieving the 
mission, leading instead to more aggression in the Delta and an international outcry over 
the repression.62 Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported abuses by personnel of the NPF, 
including indiscriminate shooting, arbitrary arrests and detention, floggings, rapes, 
looting, and extortion, all of which violated international law and the Nigerian 
Constitution. These acts of violence went unchecked, as the government remained 
impervious to community pressure groups, which only encouraged more abuse by the 
security forces.63 The NPF was clearly not “winning hearts and minds,” and there was no 
one or no group within the region capable of making the government check these abuses 
by checking NPF excesses and adopting more diplomatic civil means. 
The Nigerian Navy (NN) has the constitutional responsibility of policing the 
nation’s territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), including protection of 
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the country’s oil and gas resources, both onshore and offshore.64 The NN patrols the 
territorial waters and EEZ using all available ships and aircraft. It is structured into two 
operational commands, the Western Naval Command (WNC) based in Lagos and the 
Eastern Naval Command (ENC) in Calabar. The WNC has two operational ships, 
Nigerian Navy Ship (NNS) BEECROFT in Lagos and NNS DELTA in Warri. The ENC 
also has two ships, NNS PATHFINDER in Port Harcourt and NNS VICTORY in 
Calabar. The WNC’s area of responsibility (AOR) lies between the border with the Benin 
Republic and longitude 6o E while the ENC’s AOR lies between longitude 6o E and the 
borders with Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. The Nigerian Air 
Force (NAF) supports the NN with joint air patrols of the EEZ with the NN Air Branch. 
Due to the nature of the Delta terrain (mangrove vegetation interspersed with creeks) and 
potential oil bunkering and arms supply routes through the waters, it was natural for the 
government to employ the NN for COIN duties. 
Decree No 23 of 1992, established the first military COIN outfit in the Niger 
Delta: Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF) in response to the rising 
agitation in Ogoniland by MOSOP and failure of the NPF to effectively control the 
situation and maintain peace in the region. The RSISTF was also used to respond to the 
Ogoni crisis of May 1994 (when the four Ogoni chiefs were murdered). Its mission was 
initially to suppress Ogoni protests and later to maintain peace, law and order in Rivers 
State.65 The Nigerian Army (NA) was deployed to the Delta at this time to conduct COIN 
operations in line with its constitutional role of defending territorial integrity and other 
core interests of the of the nation, as part of RSISTF.66 The RSISTF was made up of one 
NA brigade (2nd Amphibious Brigade), Nigerian Navy Ship PATHFINDER, supported 
by 97th Special Operations Wing of the Nigerian Airforce (NAF) and elements of the 
NPF.  
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The RSISTF also applied violence indiscriminately.67 Following the arrest of 
MOSOP leaders in connection with the murder of Ogoni chiefs, security forces raided 
over 60 Ogoni villages to punish for supporting MOSOP. Both the NN and NA were 
involved in the RSISTF obliteration of these villages during the military offensive of 
May 1994.68 Six hundred people, including children, were detained and beaten, women 
raped, villages looted, and shots fired indiscriminately resulting in about 50 deaths.69 On 
Ogoni Day (January 4, 1996), six civilians were killed, hundreds injured, and over 50 
arrested in a crowd dispersal operation carried out by the NA.70 By June 1994, military 
operations had destroyed more than thirty villages with about 2,000 civilian deaths and 
100,000 internally displaced persons.71  Although these human rights violations were 
covered by the international press and led to international reaction (Appendix A, Table 
3), the national media was largely intimidated into self-censorship. Nigerian journalists 
who did cover the abuses were arrested and imprisoned and as a result political pressure 
was muted, and the military regime continued with its own sided approach.72  
The pace of military engagement in the Niger Delta increased throughout 
Abacha’s tenure, as his government dispatched the military and other security agencies to 
suppress each manifestation of discontent as it arose.73 Although, this approach helped to 
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check MOSOP activities temporarily (after MOSOP and IYC were suppressed, no other 
group protested against the government or oil companies until late 1990s), it paved the 
way for the explosion of militant groups when Abacha’s repression gave way to 
liberalization in 1998.74  By 1999, there were over 150 militant groups in the Delta region 
each claiming to be the voice of its ethnic community further exacerbating the security 
management problem (some of the more significant ones are listed in Appendix A, 
Tables 4 and 5). These groups competed with each other for influence and relevance to 
state governments and oil companies causing conflicts amongst themselves. For example, 
Ijaw and Itsekiri militias fought each other in 1998 over control of the commercial city of 
Warri, the largest in Delta State and a major source of patronage. 
After the death of Abacha, General Abubakar Abdulsalami led a short-lived 
transitional government (1998–1999) that actively pursued national reconciliation and a 
real transition to elective civilian rule.  However, President Adbdulsalami also declared a 
state of emergency in Bayelsa State and sent two naval ships and over 10,000 troops and 
NPF to Bayelsa and Delta States. Over the next two weeks, security operations resulted in 
deaths, missing persons, over 25 villages burnt, and properties destroyed. About 300 
civilians were reported dead, among them the son of the King of Kaiama.75 There was a 
huge outcry by human rights organizations against the Nigerian government, which 
became a weapon of propaganda used by the militants to further justify their actions. 
These operations provoked the first unequivocal act of insurgency when the IYC 
retaliated by unleashing a series of coordinated attacks against oil installations and 
destruction of oil pipelines in the following months.76 
Repressive COIN strategies not only failed to resolve the Delta agitation, they 
inflamed the grievances, which then exploded into insurgency with the onset of the 
liberalization associated with the transition to democratic civilian rule. As this chapter 
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has revealed, from the onset of agitation by MOSOP in 1990, the government77 
responded by adopting highly repressive measures to contain the situation, a trend that 
continued despite the fact that it was clearly not working.  It did work in terms of 
temporarily quenching an uprising, but never worked in providing a lasting solution to 
the Delta question. Civil engagement strategies were given little priority. This caused 
their failure. The suppression of political groups that could pressure the government to 
reduce its repressive strategies, restrict their security agencies from human rights abuses, 
and adopt more civil strategies, limited options available to the Niger Delta community 
and led them to resort to violence. 
C. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS UNDER THE MILITARY REGIME 
The Nigerian government created five new states in the Delta (three in 1991 and 
two in 1996) to facilitate an increase in revenue allocation and development (Figure 8).78 
This was in direct response to demands by MOSOP and other pressure groups across the 
country (for which states were also created) for development and increased revenue 
allocation. The creation of these new states was expected to reduce agitation since state 
creation comes with establishment of bank headquarters, government agencies, 
commissions, development of state hospitals, airports, universities, and many other 
employment and infrastructural development tools. 
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Figure 8.   Nine States of the Niger Delta Region Nigeria79 
Furthermore, the new states were included in federal government sponsored 
projects, revenue allocation, and budget; more states in a region translate to more 
resource allocation to the region from the federal account.80 Nonetheless, agitation 
continued, with smaller ethnic communities within the new states (which felt 
marginalized by the majority ethnic groups in the new states) demanding their own states 
(to enable them gain from the advantages of state creation).  Agitation for new states also 
began in other areas that had previously seen none. Thus, by increasing awareness of the 
revenue allocation formula, the policy actually increased demand for local control of 
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resources in the Delta.81 The “South-South” political leaders from central southern 
Nigeria (including the Niger Delta) started demanding state local resource control, to 
enable their states to capture more oil revenue.82 Hence, the policy of state and local 
government creation reinforced more local ethnic, cultural, and political identities instead 
of reducing grievances and agitation in the region. 
In addition to new states, the federal government established the Oil Mineral 
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in July 1992, under decree No. 
23, committing three percent of oil revenue to the commission for development projects 
in the Delta region.83 This doubled the previous allocation of 1.5 percent dispersed 
through the Presidential Task Force for the Development of Oil Producing Areas.84 The 
OMPADEC was widely criticized for inefficiency, lack of transparency, inadequate or 
irregular funding, a lack of accountability, official wastefulness, and excessive overhead 
expenditures, all of which contributed to its failure to reduce agitation. The first two 
leaders of OMPADEC, Albert K. Horsfall and Professor Eric Opia, were both dismissed 
for corruption. The OMPADEC leaders carried out their duties in an authoritarian style, 
failing to consult with the Delta populace as to how its funds should be spent.85 A 
struggle between Niger Delta state governments over which should provide the candidate 
for the OMPADEC chairman also limited engagement with the population and the 
effectiveness of OMPADEC.86 The organization’s performance only worsened under the 
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Abacha administration (1993–1998) as its allocation was reduced to one percent of oil 
revenue, with resources shifted to implementation of military strategies to resolve the 
crisis provoked by the execution of the MOSOP leadership (Saro Wiwa and eight 
others).87 These weaknesses of OMPADEC highlighted were as a result of lack of 
attention from the government because it was more focused on its military COIN 
strategies. Abdulsalami restructured OMPADEC, appointed new leadership, and 
promised that the commission would be more responsive to the yearnings and ambitions 
of the people. However, within a few months, as the transition to civilian authority was in 
progress, political parties emerged, election campaigns began, and focus on the Niger 
Delta was again reduced as the administration focused on its transition to democracy. 
Un-kept promises and the political space provide by liberalization also 
contributed to the emergence of several new, more assertive, pressure groups. Agitation 
was increasingly displaced by violence, especially in the Ijaw areas. The All Ijaw Youth 
Conference (AIYC) of December 1998 reinforced the Ijaw Youth Council; IYC had 
earlier reformed NDVF in October 1998 as the Ijaw Youth Community militant wing and 
was tasked to conduct insurgent activities and provide protection to the Ijaw 
communities.88 Subsequently, IYC’s NDVF launched an armed struggle against the 
government and multinational oil companies after their “Kaima Declaration.” They 
declared to stop recognizing all “undemocratic” decrees, including the Land Use Decree 
of 1978, which vested control of all lands and any resources on them to the State, and the 
Petroleum Act Decree of 1969 (as revised by the 1979 Constitution), which vested 
ownership and control of petroleum resources to the State, on the grounds that they had 
been enacted without the participation or consent of the Ijaw people. Further, they 
demanded that all multinational oil companies stop production and withdraw immediately 
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from Ijaw land.89 In response to this development, the Abdulsalami administration froze 
OMPADEC’s accounts just four months after its reform, and reemphasized repressive 
military strategies, deploying more soldiers to suppress IYC activities.90 
A field survey by Adebiyi and Aina in April 2000 on 186 respondents in three 
Niger Delta states indicates that OMPADEC was perceived to have been ineffective. 
Only 15.6 percent of respondents believed it had had any impact (Appendix A, Table 
6).91 Failure to appoint indigenes of the Niger Delta as members and chief executive of 
OMPADEC and failure to consult the local populace were identified as the biggest causes 
of its perceived ineffectiveness.92 However, the next chapter will show how democratic 
governments would appoint indigenes and consult the local population, yet there was no 
improvement of effectiveness. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The absence of effective civic counterpart strategies alongside military strategies 
coupled with deficiencies of security forces operations identified in this chapter 
contributed to the failure of resolving the Niger Delta conflict. COIN operations were out 
of control with excessive violence. More political engagement could have forced security 
forces to conduct COIN operations without massive collateral damage and human rights 
violations, because pressure groups could have identified with and stressed these abuses 
and demanded more diplomatic strategies. These would have eventually compelled the 
Nigerian government to check its security forces on violations of human rights abuses 
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and also to adopt more civic methods of resolving the crisis as will be seen in the next 
chapter. In the long run, high repression only succeeded in dousing the crisis temporarily, 
while simultaneously blocking peaceful options available for demonstrating agitation, 
thereby inducing Niger Delta activist groups to resort to insurgency. 
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III. DEMOCRATIC REGIME 1999–2009 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the strategies (civil and military) adopted by the two 
democratic governments between 1999 and 2009. It explains why COIN strategies failed 
during the democratic regime, highlighting how the Nigerian governments’ over-
responsiveness to pressure group demands from both inside and outside the Niger Delta 
undermined the effectiveness of its own COIN strategies. The civil strategies adopted by 
the Obasanjo administration (1999–2007) include the creation of the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (July 2000) and the National Political Reform Conference 
(February 2005). The Yar’Adua administration (2007-2009) established the Delta 
Summit (June 2007), Niger Delta Technical Committee (September 2008), Ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs (September 2008), and Amnesty Offer (August 2009), while 
retaining the previous government’s Niger Delta Development Commission. The civilian 
government’s strategies were similar to “McCormick’s diamond model”; they were all 
aimed at building government legitimacy both internally and externally (in the eyes of 
international actors) and as a result they became over responsive to political pressure 
group demands which then reduced the effectiveness of their strategies. Pressure groups’ 
demands interfered with government strategies because some of their demands to address 
grievances (environmental degradation, marginalization etc) transformed to unfair and 
unrealistic demands (50 percent revenue allocation), the groups also publicly condemned 
government’s strategies even before commencement of the initiatives, gathering enough 
support that made the government incapable of implementing most of its COIN 
strategies. Both administrations maintained the military COIN strategy while adding 
significant civil engagement elements to it, creating a balanced and potentially effective 
strategy.  However, the chapter will show that where the complete insulation of the 
military governments from political pressure led to overly aggressive and thus ineffective 
responses to political mobilization in the Delta, the near complete lack of insulation of 
the democratic governments from political pressure adversely affected the design and 
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implementation of their strategies. Thus, this chapter, like Chapter II, suggests that more 
moderate levels of responsiveness and autonomy would lead to more effective COIN 
strategies.   
The transition to elective government brought politicization of local ethnic 
differences in the Delta (between Ijaw, Itsekiris, and Urhobo, among others) and 
regional/ethnic tensions between different parts of the country. Politicians exploited these 
differences at election time. Election rigging, hooliganism, and violence became a major 
trend at election time all over the country, but especially the Niger Delta, which has more 
violent groups than any other part of the country. Many Delta politicians surrounded 
themselves with members of militant groups, which they used to advance their political 
careers.93  Nigerian politicians also acquired campaign funds from illegal activities and 
the “political godfathers” and militia that operate such enterprises. In the Delta, political 
elites established patron-client relationship with members of emerging militant groups 
and their leaders,94 such as Alhaji Asari Dokubo of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer 
force (NDPVF) and Ateke Tom of Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), and NDVF (militant 
wing of IYC). These groups were used to deliver votes for local government candidates 
in 2003 and 2007, through threats and act of violence against opponent politicians and 
their supporters.95 Through these alliances politicians got access to power while militant 
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groups gained protection from their elected political sponsors.96 Between election 
campaigns, the militants offered protection to illegal oil bunkerers.  Over time they 
became more directly involved in other illegal activities, often in alliance with politicians 
who used profits of oil theft to fund their campaigns.97  Thus, the interests of local 
politicians, like those of the criminal/insurgent groups that support their campaigns, 
quickly came to depend upon maintaining sufficient disorder to facilitate continuation of 
illegal oil bunkering after the 1999 transition to democracy.98 This transformed the 
political situation in the Niger Delta; groups that previously had no influence on the 
federal government now had a direct line to politics through local politicians. 
Thus, while legitimate civic groups gained new access to government through 
political pressure after 1999, indicating healthy democratic politics, a strong current of 
abuses of democratic institutions and principles also emerged. As civil society groups 
emerged (ethnic, national, international civil, and human rights groups), the armed 
struggle in the region also increased (Appendix B, Table 8).99 Civil society groups 
increased awareness and forced the Niger Delta problem onto national agenda. They 
mobilized and coordinated a struggle for self determination, equity, and civil and 
environmental rights (Appendix B, Table 9).100 This harmonized struggle reinforced civil 
society pressures of the region which is necessary, legitimate, and appropriate for 
democratization, however, the problem was that government over responded in general to 
such pressures thereby undermining its COIN strategies by making them ineffective. 
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B. SECURITY AGENCY ENGAGEMENTS (1999–2009) 
When Obasanjo took over the mantle of leadership from the military in May 1999 
he initially embraced the existing engagement strategy, involving a high level of military 
operation supplemented by limited civil engagement. In November 1999 he ordered the 
NA and NN to invade the Ijaw town of Odi in Bayelsa State in response to the murder of 
twelve members of the NPF by a gang. “Operation Hakuri II” resulted in about 2,000 
deaths and the reduction of the town to rubble.  The town’s bank, church, and health 
center remained standing, but every other building was burnt. There were also reports of 
human rights abuses, including rape by soldiers.101 The government’s stated objective 
was to investigate the incident and bring the offending youth to trial. However, sending 
military units did not tally with a mission of investigation and arrest, which are clearly 
police responsibilities. (The indiscipline of the NPF was matched by the military, so this 
cannot explain the choice of forces.) The government’s deployment of a large number of 
military troops indicates its initial intention to retain the previous governments’ highly 
coercive COIN strategy. 
The perpetrators were not apprehended, and the brutality of the operation drew 
anger and criticism locally, nationally, and internationally. Human rights groups, 
environmental rights groups (e.g., Climate  Justice Program, and Environmental Rights 
Action/Friends of the Earth Nigeria), Civil Society Groups (NDEF, NLC, and 
NDTLA)102, Senators (including the Senate President Okadigbo), and members of the 
Federal House of Representatives all visited Odi after the incident and criticized how the  
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government handled the situation.103  Local and international pressure groups, including 
Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC), Directorate for Citizen’s Rights (DCR), and the Public Complaints 
Commission (PCC) called upon the Nigerian government to initiate criminal proceedings 
against soldiers responsible for the atrocities in Odi.104 There were also calls to keep the 
military in the barracks by both insurgent groups and human rights groups.  Although 
such calls were not new, the democratic government proved far more receptive to such 
pressure than its predecessors. It responded to the demands of pressure groups by 
drastically reducing military operations. There was not another major military COIN 
operation until 2009 when ‘Operation Restore Hope’ was launched to rescue abducted 
security personnel (see chronology/timeline of Niger Delta events Appendix B, Tables 10 
and 11). 
However, there were still complaints of corruption, violence, and human rights 
abuses committed by the security forces, especially the NPF.105 In response the 
government adopted initiatives to better coordinate and control the application of force in 
the Delta. In 2002, it created the Integrated Oil Producing Areas Security and Safety 
System (IOPASS) panel, chaired by Chief of Defense Staff General Ogumudia, which 
required all military COIN operations to be cleared by the central government and in 
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some situations the Senate and House of Representatives as well as the executive.106 
Further restrictions on NPF were put in place by a Presidential Committee on Police 
Reform (PCPR) in 2008. It set up complaints procedures, developed a code of conduct 
for the NPF, and required NPF to get clearance from a central control system before 
reacting to anything, which takes two to five days.107 These delays militated against the 
needed quick response action in COIN operations, and further reduced their 
effectiveness. For example, while on patrol in December 2004 a platoon of 73 Battalion 
Elele came under sniper fire from a small settlement along the creeks in the outskirts of 
Port Harcourt city, but could not respond without clearance from higher headquarters. 
Therefore, on return to base an incidence report was forwarded to higher authorities 
requesting clearance for a search operation in the suspected militant settlement. The 
report and request was forwarded by the unit commander to the Brigade Headquarters 
onwards through the bureaucratic system set up to control these operations. It took two 
days to get the clearance. This delay gave insurgents time to move from that location, and 
the operation was called off.108 Thus, government overreaction to political pressure 
hampered the effectiveness of military and police COIN operations (while also improving 
their human rights records).109 Insurgency and oil theft both increased after these 
‘reforms’, and especially after the May 2003 elections when insurgents were abandoned 
by their political godfathers and sought other sources of funding. Between September 
2003 and September 2004 amount of oil stolen increased from about 50,000 to 200,000  
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barrels per day (Figure 9). The NDPVF led by Mujahid Asari-Dokubo and NDV led by 
Ateke Tom were both formed in July 2003 respectively, signaling the geographic 
expansion of the insurgency. 
 
Figure 9.   Level of Crude Oil Theft in the Niger Delta and Conflict Events 2003–
2006110 
In response, the government established a Joint Task Force (JTF) in Niger Delta 
in August 2003. JTF was initially tasked to secure oil installations and facilities, but 
combating armed militants was added to its mandate in 2006 as the situation worsened 
and more aggressive insurgent groups like MEND emerged. It is made up of the Nigerian 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police Force deployed over the whole Delta region (divided 
into sectors) with headquarters in Warri city of Delta State. JTF’s mission currently 
includes safeguarding oil installations, counterinsurgency, and responding to other 
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criminal acts disrupting oil production in the region.111 It has destroyed hundreds of 
illegal oil refineries, seized equipment used in bunkering, arrested many suspected oil 
thieves, and intercepted and captured many ships and boats carrying stolen crude and 
refined products out of the region.112  However, its personnel (including its commanders) 
have been involved in human rights violations and participation in illicit transactions, 
including oil bunkering.113  
Nonetheless, JTF successes significantly outweighed its failures when it was 
permitted to operate. Some of the constraints were temporarily relaxed for ‘Operation 
Restore Hope,’ which was approved by the government in May 2009 to rescue about 12 
security personnel abducted by militants.114 During ‘Operation Restore Hope’ JTF 
conducted a major offensive search and rescue operation in Oporoza community of 
Gbaramatu Kingdom, Warri South-West Local Government Area of Delta State, which 
was later expanded to other parts of the region raiding all known militant camps.  
(Operations against these camps had previously been denied clearance on the grounds 
that they were noncombatant villages.) “Operation Restore Hope” lasted for several 
weeks, during which the abducted security personnel and other hostages (Filipinos, 
Ukrainians, and Nigerians) were rescued, several militant camps dislodged, large 
quantities of arms and ammunition captured, and militant group members and leaders 
arrested.115 The operation caused about 65 civilian deaths (attributable to both security 
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forces and militants) and 30,000 displaced persons, most of whom left their homes due to 
fear of getting caught in the crossfire.  Although complaints were lodged by Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Niger Delta Traditional Leaders Association 
(NDTLA),116 reports of violations of human rights were down significantly from 
previous operations.117 The capture of militant equipment, armaments (publicly 
displayed) and rescue of hostages including foreign expatriates by JTF attracted some 
commendation by the government outside the Delta. Therefore, Operation Restore Hope 
shows that security forces can be effective if constraints are moderate. 
Nevertheless, after Operation Restore Hope the government returned to maximum 
constraints on the security forces in response to NDTC declarations that the operation 
upset the peace process it was coordinating and the demands from prominent political 
pressure groups in support of its position. The Senate committee on petroleum threatened 
to investigate the impact of Operation Restore Hope on civilians in the region,118 while 
the Southern Senators Forum (SSF) accused Yar’Adua’s administration of discrimination 
in handling crisis in the southern part of the country condemning the use of brutal force in 
addressing the Niger Delta question. Despite renewed constraints, demands for JTF 
withdrawal grew. In November 2009, a spokesman of Bayelsa State Governor Adeyi 
Asara in an interview with Voice of America officially demanded JTF withdrawal.119 
Similarly, the Northern Union, Ijaw Community leader Chief E.K Clark, and IYC called 
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on the government to suspend further military action against the militants in the 
region.120 JTF remained deployed, but constrained by the government to the point of 
ineffectiveness because it still required clearance from higher authorities such as IOPASS 
before launching any COIN operation. Unable to insulate itself from pressure group 
demands the government demobilized JTF even in the fact of clear evidence of its 
efficaciousness, thus undermining its own military COIN strategy.  Meanwhile, losses 
from oil bunkering and other economic crimes at sea by militants grew from less than $1 
billion per annum in the 1990s, to $4 billion in 2000, and $34 billion in 2008 (Appendix 
B, Table 12).121 
C. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS UNDER OBASANJO (1999–2007) 
1. Niger Delta Development Commission 
The first civil strategy adopted by the Obasanjo government was the creation of 
the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to replace the failed OMPADEC on 
12 July 2000. The NDDC was established under Act 2000 Act No.6, and its objective 
was to enhance quick, even, and sustainable development toward an economically 
prosperous, environmentally regenerative, socially, and politically stable Niger Delta to 
satisfy demands of restive populations in the region.122 NDDC Act 2000 set up a 
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percent of its oil revenue, Niger Delta state government 10 percent of their monthly 
budget, 50 percent of ecological funds due to Delta states, and three percent of oil 
companies’ budget.123 
MOSOP rejected NDDC before it was even legally established. In August 1999, 
after the NDDC establishment bill was submitted to the National House of 
Representatives (NHR) for approval, MOSOP issued a fourteen point communiqué 
criticizing the bill for including states it did not consider part of the Delta region,124 with 
an unacceptable composition of NDDC council. The communiqué further highlighted 
that NDDC was only aimed at implementing measures approved by the government in 
the Niger Delta area which they felt did not comply with the needs of the Delta populace. 
Within the same period in (August 1999), a conference was held by state house of 
assembly speakers from six states of the Delta region who also rejected the bill.125  There 
were also some groups and individuals who criticized the commission with more 
reasonable and legitimate reasons such as the Bayelsa State Governor Diepreye Alamie-
yeseigha, who claimed that the federal government lacked the political will to implement 
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about 50 civil society organizations from the Delta region, also demanded a legal 
framework to strengthen NDDC, which it claimed had been starved of funds by Senate 
and House of Representatives.126 
Niger Delta pressure groups and politicians (including Bayelsa State governor, 
speakers of Niger Delta states houses of assembly, and NDCSC caused state governments 
to withhold funds. Between 2001 and 2004 the federal government contributed 78 
percent of the $341 million dispersed to NDDC, while Delta state governments failed to 
contribute anything and oil companies were inconsistent in their payments.127 
2. National Political Reform Conference 
In response to agitations by ethnic pressure groups all over the country, and 
especially the Niger Delta, President Obasanjo convened the National Political Reform 
Conference (NPRC) in February 2005.  The conference was to reach a consensus on 
aspects of the federal structure, resource control, devolution of power to federating units, 
and explicit recognition of ethnic nationalities as a means of finding a lasting solution to 
perennial problems in various parts of the country, including the Delta.128 NPRC 
membership was made up of 354 persons.  Fifty (the top senior members) were 
nominated by the president, 218 nominated by state governors, and 86 selected from 
different groups again by the government (Appendix B, Table 13). The president and 28 
of 36 states governors were Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) members.129  The 
organization of the conference was on several occasions modified by the government in 
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response to new demands from pressure groups over perceived biases in its composition. 
After the appointment of Justice Nike Tobi and Reverend Father Mathew Kukah, both 
Christians, as NPRC’s chairman and secretary respectively, a delegation of politicians, 
Muslim clerics and traditional rulers from northern Nigeria met with President Obasanjo 
to complain about the underrepresentation of Muslims in the conference.130 The president 
immediately responded by appointing a Muslim, Professor Ishaq Oloyede as co-secretary 
of NPRC. Other civil pressure groups followed suit.131  As the government complied 
with pressure group demands by appointing their representatives as delegates, delegates 
became more concerned with protecting their group’s interest than working toward a 
consensus, which was the main objective of NPRC. Delegates maintained unrealistic 
stances in support of their group’s interests and were not prepared to compromise. 
Delegates from the Niger Delta boycotted the last part of the conference after their 
demand for an immediate increase of revenue allocation from 13 percent to 25 
percentwith an annual five percent increase for five years to 50 percent was opposed and 
a recommendation of an increase to only 17 percent approved. The delegates’ action was 
supported by MOSOP, IYC, and prominent politicians including Rivers State Governor 
Peter Odili, who advocated an increase to 25 percent.132 The demand for 50 percent, or 
even 25 percent, of oil revenue to be allocated to the Delta States was unreasonable and 
uncompromising.  Oil revenue constitutes more than 90 percent of government revenue, 
while the Delta comprises only 20 percent of the population (30 million of 150 million). 
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Fifty percent allocation was reasonable in the 1960s, when oil revenue was less than 50 
percent of government revenue, meaning that 50 percent distribution to the Delta was 
generally proportionate to the size of the population.133 The NPRC submitted its report 
and recommendations to President Obasanjo in July 2005 with no Niger Delta delegate 
present because the recommendations did not satisfy their region’s demands. The absence 
of buy-in from the Delta doused any hope that the NPRC recommendations would 
resolve the crisis. Government’s over-responsiveness to pressure groups transformed the 
conference from a national dialogue into a sectional debate, encouraging groups that 
failed to impose their interest on NPRC such as Niger Delta delegates to boycott the 
conference. 
Civil society groups that had been lobbying for a sovereign national conference to 
address the many issues that came to the fore with democratization opposed the NPRC as 
a diversion from this goal. These groups, including the Ethnic Nationalities Forum (ENF) 
and Peoples National Conference (PNC), formed a civil society conglomerate, the Pro-
National Conference Organizations (PRONACO), which attacked NPRC and its 
recommendations because they were of the opinion NPRC had turned into a sectional 
battle between pressure groups’ representatives from all parts of the country at the 
conference each pursuing their group’s interest.134 The influential Supreme Royal 
Council of Traditional Rulers in Nigeria (SRCTRN) came out against NPRC on the 
grounds that it had devolved into a forum for regional groups fighting for local interest 
that threatened national unity, demanding that it be dissolved.135 Because of these 
pressures, the Obasanjo administration was unwilling to go against these pressure groups 
by implementing NPRC’s recommendations. Therefore, in the end, the government 
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attempted to avoid displeasing any of the pressure groups by doing nothing. This shows 
how over-responsiveness to civic demands undermined the efficaciousness of the 
government’s own civic engagement/COIN strategy. Sectional pressure led to 
government action (making changes to NPRC’s composition) that undermined the design 
of the strategy, which then led to civic opposition, which government again over-
responded to by failing to implement any recommendations. The Nigerian government’s 
lack of political insulation from its COIN strategies undermined its ability to implement 
its own program. 
D. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS UNDER YAR’ADUA (2007–2009) 
1. Delta Summit 
The Yar’adua administration undertook several potentially efficacious initiatives 
to resolve the crisis. The first was the Delta Summit, announced less than a month after 
Yar’Adua took power in June 2007, which was designed to bring all stake holders to the 
table to discuss and proffer solutions to the Niger Delta situation.136 By narrowing the 
national focus of the NPRC to a region-specific one, this initiative preempted the 
sectional struggle that had undermined NPRC.  Nevertheless, the composition of the 
summit was again challenged from the outset.  The government meant for it to be led by a 
national figure, but ethnic leaders and militant groups of the Niger Delta demanded that it 
be overseen by an international body, such as the United Nations (UN), to guarantee a 
neutral and unbiased approach.  The government immediately responded to these 
demands by appointing former advisor to the United Nations Secretary General Ibrahim 
Gambari as chairman of the summit.137 Gambari was a long-serving and well-respected 
UN official, who had also served as a Nigerian government official. Vice President 
Goodluck Jonathon publicly stated that although there were more capable people to steer 
the summit, the government had “settled for the UN man” to satisfy demands from the 
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Delta.138 Nevertheless, Delta leaders criticized him on the grounds that he was from one 
of the country’s major ethnic groups (Yoruba) and therefore presumed biased, insisting 
the chairman be from the Delta if he were to be a Nigerian.139 The Nigerian Labor 
Congress (NLC) Union, a dominant national political pressure group, opposed Gambari’s 
leadership on the grounds that he lacked credibility as a result of having defending Saro 
Wiiwa’s execution when he was UN ambassador in 1995.140  Meanwhile, NDTLA, along 
with other groups, insisted that the summit was unnecessary and the government should 
simply review the recommendations of earlier committees (from Willink to the NPRC) 
and select the most feasible ones for implementation.141 MEND claimed that the summit 
was a ‘jamboree’ that was bound to fail.142 The Yar’ Adua government, like Obsanjo’s 
government before it, was immobilized by these pressures. After drafting a program to 
convene the Summit, Gambari withdrew in the face of opposition that promised to derail 
the Summit without more forceful government action.143 The government then postponed 
the Summit in deference to Delta political leaders request for discussions prior to 
appointment of a new chairman. There was a lull that dragged on for a year before the 
government finally cancelled the Summit on 16 July 2008 in response to continuing 
opposition from pressure groups.  Once again government’s lack of insulation from 
pressure groups undermined its ability to implement its civic COIN strategy. 
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2. Technical Committee 
Having abandoned its own initiative, the Yar’Adua administration pursued the 
Delta groups’ preferred alternative. In September 2008, it established the Niger Delta 
Technical Committee (NDTC) with the task of collating reports and recommendations 
from all previous committees.144 Using these reports the Committee was to provide the 
government a summary of short, medium, and long term initiatives to bring peace, 
stability, and development to the region.145 The Committee’s 45 members were drawn 
exclusively and equally from the nine states of the Niger Delta, again in compliance with 
demands of MEND, MOSOP, and NDTLA.146  MOSOP President Ledum Mitee was 
appointed as chairman, and leading Delta civil society activist Nkoyo Toyo as secretary 
of the Committee. Vice President Jonathan (also a Delta indigene) publicly pledged that 
the committee’s recommendations would be seriously considered. NDTC produced a set 
of recommendations, including amnesty for militants who would agree to demobilization, 
disarmament and rehabilitation within six months, increased allocation of oil revenue to 
25 percent and provision of infrastructure, social welfare services, regional development, 
and human capital development. Although, some of the report’s recommendations were 
overly ambitious (like unconditional bail of Henry Okah and provision of 5,000 mega 
watts to the region by 2010), there were key ones such as amnesty, Disarmament, 
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on the challenges of resolving the unrest and also met the major Niger Delta demands. If 
these three recommendations had been accepted by the government NDTC would likely 
have had a positive impact on the crisis.147 
However, political groups from outside the Niger Delta, especially from the North 
and West, again quietly warned that implementation would cause a reaction in other 
regions that could create problems bigger than the Niger Delta crisis.148 Meanwhile, 
MEND criticized the report for being too cautious about accommodating the northern 
elites, and thus failing to address vital issues such as the control of resources by the 
central government under fiscal federalism.149 Some civic organizations, including the 
Conference of Ethnic Nationalities of Niger Delta (CENND), also claimed that the report 
failed to address aspirations of ethnic nationalities of the region (i.e., equity, fairness, and 
justice), maintaining demands for 50 percent revenue allocation and eventual full control 
of resources with payment of appropriate taxes to the government.150  Other Delta civic 
groups, including NDTLA and NDCSC supported NDTC recommendations, recognizing 
their potential to improve the situation in the region. However, the government again 
failed to proceed with implementation, despite support from some civics.  Even though it 
now had some civic allies, it was still immobilized by competing demands of more 
politically influential groups inside and outside the Delta, demonstrating that it lacked the 
autonomy to step back from these pressures and govern. Yar’Adua caved on creating the 
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Committee as the Delta groups wanted it, but did not carry through and accept the 
recommendations because his government was unwilling to confront more daunting 
opposition by pressure groups from Northern (Arewa Consultative Forum) and Western 
(Afenifere) parts of the country, as well as Delta insurgents, whose interests were in 
maintaining disorder thus responded by not implementing NDTC recommendations. 
When the NDTC report was submitted to the government on 1 December 2008,151 
President Yar’Adua announced that “acceptable” recommendations would be identified 
and implemented.152  After two months of inaction, prominent members of the NDTC, 
including Tony I. Uranta, and concerned elders of the region under Niger Delta Elders 
Forum (NDEF) demanded government action on the report.153 In response, a special 
advisor to the Vice President disclosed that yet another committee had been convened to 
study the recommendations of the NDTC.154  In March 2009, the President officially 
announced the creation of the new committee.155 Since then no decision has been taken 
on the NDTC report, and nothing has been said about the new committee. The 
government made these announcements to ease tension and stall the issue because, like 
the Obasanjo government before it, it cannot come up with a COIN policy that satisfies 
all pressure groups and is unable or unwilling to adopt a policy that does not satisfy 
everyone. Once again, the government was unable to insulate its COIN strategy from 
pressure groups and eventually responded by failing to implement NDTC 
recommendations. 
3. Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs 
In an effort to address environmental degradation and unemployment, presumed 
root causes of insurgency, the Yar’adua administration created the Ministry of Niger 
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Delta Affairs (MNDA) in September 2008. MNDA was designed to undertake youth 
empowerment initiatives, and tackle the challenges of infrastructural development and 
environmental protection in the region by providing economic growth, developmental 
projects (including roads, electricity, and other utilities) addressing communities’ 
peculiar needs and enhancing environmental preservation for the developmental 
transformation of the Niger Delta.156 NDDC, which was initially an independent 
freestanding organization, was now placed under MNDA as one of its parastatals.157  
Niger Delta indigene Ufot Ekaette was appointed Minister.  
Although it is too soon to evaluate the efficaciousness of MNDA, the early 
evidence suggests that it too is highly susceptible to pressure group demands.  Soon after 
being appointment minister, Ekaette went round the nine states of the Delta to discuss 
and seek views of various political groups.158  This ‘consultative approach’ was intended 
to create opportunities for Delta groups to influence policy.  However, the influence that 
was exerted was again sectional rather than substantive.  MEND and NDPVF demanded 
that greater part of MNDA contracts be awarded exclusively to Niger Delta companies. 
In a follow up in December 2009, a group of ex-militant commanders (that accepted 
amnesty see below) led by Chief Government Ekpomukpolo (Tompolo) made similar 
demands to Vice President Jonathan, threatening to disrupt the operations of non-
indigenous companies already in the region if the demands were not met.159 The 
government caved in to this pressure, and MNDA started awarding most contracts to 
Niger Delta companies, which are often less qualified than those outside the region.160 
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4. Amnesty 
The last civil engagement measure adopted by the Yar’Adua government was the 
offer of amnesty to militants who would surrender their arms and cease participation in 
violence and the release of militant leaders from prison.161 The president’s announcement 
of the amnesty/release to the national executive of his ruling PDP in April 2009 was 
accompanied by another announcement: that the government was purchasing new 
equipment for the security forces operating in the Delta region to enable the military fight 
the militants more effectively.  In August, amnesty along with training and employment 
assistance was officially offered to Niger Delta militants willing to disarm.162 MEND 
agreed to take part in the amnesty only if its leader Henry Okah was released from jail, 
development and revenue allocation issues were resolved, and a well coordinated peace 
arrangement was set up under the supervision of a respected international mediator.163 
Government agreed to negotiate on these issues and Okah accepted amnesty and was 
released in July 2009, after which he was invited for dialogue with government officials 
on regional development. MEND leader Ebikabowei Victor Ben also accepted the 
amnesty offer after Okah was released.164 Other insurgent leaders, including Jonjon 
Oyeinfe of IYC, demanded withdrawal of military forces as part of the amnesty, claiming 
to fear that they and their forces would be killed by the military if they disarmed while 
JTF was deployed in the region.165 At the end of the disarmament exercise in October 
2009, over 20,000 insurgents had accepted the amnesty offer, although only 2,760 arms 
and 18 gun boats had been collected. The ratio of arms collected to militants surrendered 
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suggests that arms were maintained, or left with others who did not disarm.  Media 
reports suggest that the vast majority of militants including those that showed up for 
amnesty program were still fully armed.  The insurgency spiked immediately after the 
amnesty program, suggesting that the acceptance of the offer was a pragmatic move to 
collect the payment of 65,000 Naira ($432) a month for three months (during 
rehabilitation, August 6 to October 4, 2009) offered by the government before returning 
to violence.166 During the disarmament period, MEND continued operations, attacking 
pipelines at Billie/Krakama while Russian President Medvedev was visiting Nigeria, to 
discourage his investment in them.167 In response to these developments, the government 
decided to keep security forces in the Delta. Complying with MEND’s demands to 
release their leader (Henry Okah) before reaching an agreement and completing 
disarmament enabled them to abandon the amnesty program and continue insurgency 
without any loss.  Government’s over-responsiveness to insurgent groups’ demand 
undermined its COIN strategy. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter highlighted how the civilian administration initially started on the 
same footing as the military regime it took over from in addressing the Niger Delta crisis, 
however, was more sensitive to political pressure than its predecessors and thus adopted 
more diplomatic strategies while reducing the military ones within the first year of 
democratic rule. Security forces were less engaged in COIN operations during this period 
than previously because elected governments generally gave more emphasis to civil 
engagement, and were more responsive to pressure group demands to restrain the 
application of force. However, the inability of the government to manage its own 
response to competing demands by pressure groups inside and outside the Delta 
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undermined its civil and military COIN initiatives. The government lacked the capability 
of insulating itself from pressure group demands thus continued adjusting, deferring, and 
introducing new COIN initiatives and strategies while their recommendations were not 
being implemented because it was trying to satisfy all groups. Similarly, governments 
over-responded to complaints against security forces’ COIN operations by constraining 
their operations in the Delta region making them even less effective. As a result no 
tangible peace effort was made by the democratic governments (1999–2009), which 
therefore failed to resolve the Niger Delta problem. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws together insights from the analysis of the military and 
democratic regimes on how political pressure has affected the design and implementation 
of strategies to resolve the Niger Delta crisis. The chapter also proffers recommendations 
on how the Nigerian government can insulate itself from such pressures that interfere 
with its strategic design and implementation capabilities in order to enable a successful 
COIN strategy under democratic regimes, and thus the way forward in resolving the 
Niger Delta conflict. 
B. SECURITY AGENCY ENGAGEMENTS 
The main thrust used in addressing the Niger Delta agitation during military 
regimes as would be expected was an overly high non-diplomatic COIN strategy. Most 
military dictatorships often confront insurgency with force to squelch it, because they 
have a culture that is unresponsive to civilian demands. Pertinent to this, Nigerian 
military regimes also had limited tolerance to pressure groups, then again the few 
pressure groups that existed were apprehensive in challenging these autocratic 
governments; groups like NDTLA, Delta Oil Producing Communities Association 
(DOPCA), and SMF never challenged any of the regimes. This situation enabled the 
government to use more of non-diplomatic COIN strategies in suppressing agitation 
while ignoring the few pressure groups’ that were able to make demands. The application 
of force was too much, and not balanced by civil engagements which enabled security 
forces mainly the NPF and military to commit human rights abuses while conducting 
COIN operations in the region.  This was due to absence of pressure groups capable of 
challenging military regimes and compelling them to control their security forces during 
COIN operations; the few groups that tried, such as HRW, MOSOP, and IYC were 
ignored. The government remained impervious to these community pressure groups, 
which subsequently encouraged more abuse. The Nigerian Armed Forces who were 
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initially deployed as RSISTF in the Delta region to fill in for NPF ineffectiveness also 
failed to resolve the crisis. Owing to their over repressive COIN operations and absence 
of dominant political  pressure groups that can compel the government to reduce military 
and adopt more civil COIN strategies, the effect of the repressive strategy on the 
perceptions and behaviors of the people in the region was insignificant. Because the 
military governments were insensitive to pressure groups’ who identified and stressed on 
these abuses and subsequently demanded a check on RSISTF excesses by the Nigerian 
government, security forces were never checked.   
Unlike the military regimes period where the government ignored complaints on 
security forces’ brutality and human rights abuses, similar complaints from now more 
influential pressure groups, were consistently responded to by democratic governments 
(1999–2009). However, the response was so much that the security forces became over 
constrained to a level that they could not be effective in COIN operations.  Consequently, 
security forces COIN strategies failed in the two periods however, due to different 
reasons. The military governments allowed too little input from civil society while the 
democratic governments allowed too much. 
C. CIVIL ENGAGEMENTS 
Throughout Military regimes’ period, only two diplomatic COIN strategies were 
adopted (state creation and OMPADEC) while the democratic regimes adopted more than 
six initiatives within the same time frame. Because military regimes ignored Delta 
pressure groups’ agitation, the civic COIN strategies they employed were created in 
isolation from Delta people. Strategies were therefore designed to address what the 
military governments believed were the key issues instead of addressing what the Delta 
populace considered to be central to their agitation such as environmental degradation, 
higher percentage of oil revenue, and marginalization. Consequently, military 
governments, like their democratic counterparts, generated social pressures with their 
attempt to use material ‘carrots’ and then caving into them afterwards. Consequently, 
state creation was used by military regimes as a COIN strategy because it comes with 
employment, developmental tools, and federal revenue allocation, however, it failed to 
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resolve the crisis because it increased awareness of federal revenue allocation formula 
causing rise in demand for state creation and agitation for local control of resources 
within the Delta region. Furthermore, smaller ethnic communities within new states felt 
marginalized by the majority ethnic groups and therefore they also started demanding for 
their own states. Consequently, as more states were created in 1996 in addition to those 
created in 1991, instead of quenching agitation, it further reinforced local ethnic, cultural, 
and political identities.  
OMPADEC was established in July 1992 and was maintained until end of 
military period in 1999. Most of the complaints against OMPADEC and its authoritarian 
leadership style was mainly due to absence of pressure groups capable of compelling the 
government to encourage engagement and consultation between OMPADEC and the 
local populace of the Niger Delta on development requirements of the region. In addition, 
lack of effective pressure groups that would have acted as an oversight on OMPADEC 
permitted a particular kind of corruption in the program. Because of military 
governments’ insensitivity to Niger Delta civic groups’ demands, OMPADEC operated 
without consulting with the Delta populace on prioritizing its projects, its leadership was 
able to pursue individual interests by awarding contracts to the highest bidder (company), 
earmarking projects at preferred areas. This affected OMPADEC’s effectiveness because 
the Niger Delta populace felt OMPADEC was not addressing their immediate problems 
since the government ignored them and executed its projects the way it deemed fit 
without consulting the Delta people, thus did not have much impact in addressing 
grievances. Towards the end of the military regime some reasonable modifications were 
made to OMPADEC by Abdulsami’s administration in an effort to resolve the Delta 
agitation but due to the short time the administration had, nothing was achieved. 
Contrary to this, was the case during civil regimes, political pressures did not only 
influence projects to be executed in the region, but also compelled the leadership to 
award majority of the contracts to Niger Delta indigenous companies who were not 
always as efficient as other companies outside the Niger Delta, thus made democratic 
governments’ COIN strategies less effective because they could not isolate the design and 
implementation of the strategies from pressure group interference. However, the 
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commonality between the two periods is that the tendency toward abuse was always 
there, although exacerbated by the over-responsiveness of the democratic regimes, thus 
suggest that state weakness affects implementation of strategies in both cases. Military 
regimes employed only two diplomatic COIN strategies and because they were so 
insensitive to pressure groups demands, the strategies adopted had limited likelihood of 
addressing the Niger Delta question because the governments did not consult with the 
Niger Delta people during design of the strategies thus did not address what the local 
populace considered as vital issues and need to be addressed immediately. This 
eventually resulted into the military regimes relying on mostly non-diplomatic COIN 
strategies to address the Niger Delta question which instead of quenching the crisis ended 
up blowing it into greater dimensions. 
After transiting to democracy in 1999, the Obasanjo government (1999–2007) 
responded to pressure group activity much more than the military regimes, which was 
evident from the increase in varieties of diplomatic efforts, initiatives, and strategies 
adopted with reduced military COIN strategies. This was the outcome of influence of 
pressure groups that due to democratic liberalization were now capable of challenging the 
government on strategies it used in addressing the Niger Delta problem and also the 
increased sensitivity of democratic governments to pressure groups which made them 
more willing to satisfy their demands. However, in an effort to satisfy all parties 
involved, democratic governments became over responsive to a level that they could no 
longer insulate its own COIN strategies’ design and implementation from pressure group 
interference thereby making the strategies less ineffective. Public outcry from political, 
civil, and ethnic pressure groups all over the country against NPRC ended up preventing 
any of NPRC’s recommendations to be adopted. The Nigerian government was unable to 
implement its own COIN strategy because it was not willing to go against the interest of 
any pressure group. Therefore, the government over responded to pressure groups’ 
demands by making changes to NPRC’s composition which undermined the design of the 
strategy, and drove the process by which everyone rejected it, then the government again 
bowed to popular pressure and over responded by abandoning NPRC’s 
recommendations.  Similarly, opposition to NDDC by prominent Delta pressure groups 
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encouraged Niger Delta state governments to shy away from contributing their own quota 
to NDDC because they were unwilling face possible challenges from these political 
groups, if they support an initiative that has been condemned by the groups. In the long 
run failure of state governments to contribute their own quota undermined the 
effectiveness of NDDC, because it lacked the required funds to carry out its tasks. The 
Yar’Adua administration (2007–2009) introduced other new diplomatic strategies 
including the Delta Summit, NDTC, and the Amnesty program. However, by the time 
Yar’Adua’s administration took over, pressure groups had become more influential and 
politically relevant. Insurgency level was also high because attacks on oil installations, oil 
companies, military locations, kidnappings, and oil theft were concurrently ongoing at 
this period (Appendix B, Table 11 timeline). These pressure groups interfered with 
government strategic implementation just because they did not believe it was going to 
work. They were able to rally against its implementation and because the government 
was incapable of insulating its own COIN strategies from pressure group interference, the 
situation again resulted into dissolution of Delta Summit and formation of a flawed 
strategy the NDTC that is least likely to resolve anything. Thus, it also ended up like the 
earlier strategies; its implementation was interfered by pressure groups outside the Niger 
Delta because the government responded to their demands by failing to adopt any of its 
recommendations. 
The Amnesty offer which was the last diplomatic COIN strategy undertaken by 
Yar’Adua administration was not fully accepted by insurgent groups most especially 
MEND. Opposition was mainly from insurgent leadership because they were not ready to 
lose their forces they used to accrue funds through oil theft and kidnappings. Due to 
existing distrust between the two parties (government and insurgents), insurgent 
leadership was able to convince many of their forces not to disarm using government’s 
failure to withdraw JTF as a threat to what could happen to them if they disarm. 
Suspicion was further intensified when MEND refused to accept amnesty and disarm 
after the government responded and complied with their terms of accepting amnesty by 
releasing their leader Henry Okah. The slow and unimpressive disarmament process of 
the amnesty program also confirmed the success of interference of the amnesty offer by 
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insurgent groups’ leadership; many remained armed. Yar’Adua government’s premature 
over-responsiveness in complying with MEND’s demands (releasing their leader) before 
commencement of amnesty program gave the group the advantage they needed, thus 
continued insurgency, which eventually sabotaged the government’s COIN strategy.  
Furthermore, Yar’Adua’s medical evacuation out of the country for more than three 
months further complicated the problems militating the amnesty program. Subsequently, 
as early as January 2010 groups like MEND returned to insurgency, attacking oil 
installations violating the amnesty seize fire agreement, few weeks later other insurgent 
groups followed suit.  
Unlike the military period, pressure groups turned out to be very effective during 
the democratic regimes because the democratic governments were more sensitive to their 
demands, and as a result adopted high levels of diplomatic COIN strategies while 
maintaining a very low level of military COIN strategies. Pressure groups were able to 
influence state policies mainly because it is a democratic government, which like most 
democratic regimes is trying to satisfy everyone in order to secure votes. This situation 
enabled pressure groups to stall government efforts in taking decisive action in resolving 
the conflict at both state and national levels by interfering with design and 
implementation of governments’ own strategies. 
Due to the reasons highlighted above, the Nigerian government has been unable 
to contain and eliminate this threat to its vital economic and security interest to date. The 
government has adopted some of the strategic design and strategic implementation 
counterinsurgency models explained in the literature review however, because little 
attention has been paid to the influence of political pressure to these strategies they turned 
out to be ineffective, thus proving the hypothesis of the study that the absence of political 
pressure during the military regime (1990–1999) led to an overly aggressive military 
response, while during the democratic regime (1999–2009) political pressure at local, 
state and national level has led to an overly cautious military response. Therefore, the 




these strategies by finding the correct proportion of sticks and carrots that will convince 
the Niger Delta populace to stop supporting insurgency and become committed to finding 
a permanent way of resolving the crisis. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nigerian democratic governments have been over-responsive to pressure group 
demands because it is trying to accommodate everyone and therefore have not been able 
to insulate its COIN strategies from pressure group interference that make the strategies 
ineffective. Democratic dispensation offers the best possible situation for adopting a 
successful COIN strategy; however, the government will have to find a way of listening 
to all input from civil society, and then design and implement its own policy without 
trying to accommodate everybody or trying to avoid going against the interest of 
everyone.  Engaging Delta groups in a sustained transparent dialogue is crucial to the 
Delta dilemma possibly with the objective of breaking up the pressure group interference. 
This can be achieved by bringing together genuine civic groups both within and outside 
the Niger Delta to resolve issues while empowering them to counter adverse influence of 
sectional/insurgent interests that are likely to interrupt government’s COIN strategies. 
Allowing genuine civic groups to participate in the design and implementation of 
government strategies will help expose the negativity of pressure group interference on 
government strategies, furthermore, if supported by the government these civic groups 
could be used to counter groups against government strategies by forming a pro-
government strategies group that would press against sectional/insurgent group 
interference. Presence of opposing pressure groups who are pro effective strategies and 
against the interference could help in balancing the pressure thus allow the government to 
implement effective strategies whether civil or military engagements or a mixture of 
both, for example exploiting the situation where genuine pressure groups (NDCSC and 
NDTLA) supported NDTC. This will help protect government COIN strategies from 
pressure group interference. 
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To earn public confidence, security agencies should devote greater attention to 
improving its image in order to elicit better cooperation from the Niger Delta citizenry. 
Since often times small problems can be blown up into major human rights abuse issues 
that usually attract government over responsiveness (constraining security forces) that 
renders them ineffective, security agencies would benefit by maintaining its own 
capability to educate the public about what it is doing, why, and how; including what it is 
doing to discipline abusers amongst its personnel and how citizens can report abuse 
committed by members of security forces. Furthermore, there should be more vigorous, 
sophisticated and sustained public relations campaign with a view to projecting the force 
more positively and with greater integrity in the public eye. All security forces especially 
the police would require more professional training when conducting their operations 
especially on political and humanitarian issues to avoid of human rights abuses. Although 
non-diplomatic COIN strategies are not likely to resolve the crisis, they will still be 
required to counter insurgent groups that have become more inclined to criminality than 
grievances and are therefore not likely to accept any meaningful/realistic solution. 
However, for other insurgent and agitating groups that have legitimate grievances, 
diplomatic strategies could be designed and implemented while preventing any political 
interference or the already existing strategies could be reformed by expelling political 
issues highlighted in this study which made their design and implementation deficient. 
This will increase likelihood of resolving the Niger Delta question within a short time. 
The Nigerian Federal Government should as much as possible avoid being too 
responsive to political pressures and be able to stand up to political demands by isolating 
its COIN strategies from their impact. It should try to contain the overbearing influence 
of pressure groups by restricting its response to only legitimate, positive, and realistic 
demands from such groups that will enhance its strategies rather than make them 
obsolete. While implementing its strategies, adopting the practice of true federalism, 
spreading power and responsibilities down to state and local government levels in the 
Niger Delta would also assist the government in successfully resolving the crisis. This 
could be done by creating bipartisan commissions at state and local government levels in 
the region or by placing already existing Delta state governments’ initiatives such as the 
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Delta State Oil Producing Areas Development Commission (DESOPADEC) and Rivers 
State Sustainable Development Agency (RSSDA)168 under central government strategies. 
In this way responsibility will be spread, federal government will have reduced pressure 
from sectional groups against its own strategies, and thus will be able to implement the 
strategies without fear of being blamed for any issues or having to satisfy everyone since 
states will be left to resolve such issues with their individual local pressure groups. 
Furthermore, impact of opposing pressure groups on government strategies could be 
reduced by ensuring bureaucrats form larger part of the composition of federal 
government agencies executing the COIN strategies. Since bureaucratic cadre is a group 
that is more inherently insulated from political pressure, establishing agencies composed 
of mainly professional civil servants rather than interest group representatives will isolate 
government COIN strategies from political interference and lead to effective decisions 
that the government can accept and then blame the bureaucrats when responding to any 
pressures against such decisions. The newly created MNDA provides a good opportunity 
for adopting these recommendations. State and local government initiatives could be 
placed under the ministry similar to how NDDC was made one of the ministry’s 
parastatals, while ensuring staff are mainly composed of bureaucrats, and then federal 
government can implement its strategies via the ministry, through state and local 
government initiatives in the Niger Delta region. However, the government will need to 
spell out the relationship between NDDC, MNDA, local, state, and other actors so that all 
their efforts can be harmonized and organized towards one direction for efficiency and to 
reduce interference of pressures groups.  This will help bring the ministry back on a 
better track for resolving the crisis with limited pressure on federal government design 
and implementation its own COIN strategies. 
Politics in Nigeria is still at its prime, the democratic process is not yet an ideal 
democracy, and just like anywhere politics in Nigeria requires considerable amount of 
funding; wealth and power has become distinct in the country’s political dimension, 
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therefore politicians seek for funds from all sources including illegal activities and 
political sponsors. These funds are used to rig elections and buy support of militias 
especially in the Delta region who are also employed as political thugs. This trend of 
politics is today embedded in Nigerian politics; unfortunately democratization has led to 
few controls on corruption. Therefore, it has become imperative to end Niger Delta 
politicians/insurgent relationship that is helping to fuel the Delta crisis since politicians 
place pressure on government’s COIN strategies to protect their allies (insurgents). 
Measures have to be taken that would prevent all forms of illegal political gains. 
Constitutional amendment to remove immunity to political office holders such as 
president, vice president and state governors and empowering anti corruption bodies such 
as Economic Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to investigate political office holders 
both at local, state and national levels will likely eliminate illegal financial benefits from 
political offices, make politicians more weary of their actions, and become more cautious 
on interfering with strategic decisions in the Niger Delta based on individual or group 
interests. If politicians cannot buy office, they will not support militias and if they cannot 
benefit financially from holding office, then the office is less valuable, and they will not 
go to such lengths to attain and keep it by interfering with government COIN strategies 
that do not favor the insurgents they often rely on for votes and countering political 
opponents during elections. 
The present democratic government could also respond to pressures against its 
strategies by involving third parties like the UN or eminent persons from different 
countries to negotiate with militant and pressure groups’ leaders. This would demonstrate 
to the Delta populace government’s readiness to address the Niger Delta question on a 
neutral ground without favor to any pressure group from any part of the country. In 
addition, it will also assist in isolating government COIN strategies from pressure groups 
because persons from outside the country are less likely to be influenced by any pressure 
group within Nigeria. 
Finally, the Nigerian Senate and National House of Assembly should also be 
involved in all arrangements so that they can monitor the peace process in the Niger 
Delta. Unlike NDTC that was conducted without any representative from the National 
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House of Assembly, members of senate and house of assembly should participate in 
government COIN initiatives so that as pressures groups start condemning the initiatives 
and making demands that will evidently reduce its effectiveness if responded to by 
government, they will be able to appreciate how these groups interfere with government 
COIN strategies. This will hopefully expose the negative impact of pressure groups on 
government COIN strategies to fellow politicians at the national level and would 
probably initiate a political counter action against pressure groups interference that could 
result to protecting and strengthening the effectiveness of government strategies. 
The Nigerian democratic government can effectively resolve the Niger Delta 
crisis but will have to balance its diplomatic and non-diplomatic COIN strategies to a 
more moderate level that is just right. The study revealed how military regimes’ COIN 
strategies failed to resolve the Niger Delta crisis because they were insensitive to Delta 
pressure groups ignoring their demands and as result implemented overly high military 
engagements with low civil/diplomatic engagements. In the same vein, democratic 
regimes’ COIN strategies also failed however, the opposite was the reason for their 
failure, they were too sensitive to pressure group demands and thus adopted high civil 
engagements with low military engagements. Both regimes failed as a result of imbalance 
of strategies they adopted. Therefore, since a blend of high military with low civil 
engagement failed, and low military with high military engagement also failed, the study 
recommends a balanced approach; a moderate civil with moderate military engagement 
to successfully address the Niger Delta question. One way of doing this is relaxing some 
of the constraints placed by democratic government on its security forces that have made 
them ineffective, similar to what was done during “Operation Restore Hope” when 
security forces proved to be effective if not over constrained.  In addition, democratic 
governments will also need to provide the correct level of autonomy on its civil COIN 
strategies that would enable the government insulate their design and implementation 
from pressure group interference. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table 2.   Historical Value of One U.S Dollar to the Nigerian Naira169 
Date   Naira per US $  Date   Naira per US $  
1972        0.658   1991   8.04  
1973       0.658   1992    9.91  
1974        0.63   1993    17.30  
1975        0.616   1994    22.33  
1976        0.62   1995   21.89   
1977        0.647  1996    21.89  
1978        0.606   1997    21.89  
1979      0.596   1998    21.89  
1980      0.550   1999   21.89  
1981      0.61    2000   85.98  
1982     0.673   2001  99-106  
1983     0.724   2002   109-113  
1984      0.765   2003   114-127  
1985      0.894   2004   127-130  
1986      2.02    2005   132-136  
1987      4.02    2006   128.50-131.80  
1988     4.54    2007   120-125  
1989      7.39    2008   115.50-120  
1990      7.39    2009   145-171 
                                                 
169 Timeline Results for Naira Dollar Exchange Rate History 1970–2010, accessed 23 August 2010, 
http://www.google.com/search?q= naira+dollar+exchange+rate+history. 
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Table 3.   Timeline of the Ogoni Conflict170 
1993 
January 4: 300,000 Ogoni protest against Shell Oil activities and the environmental destruction 
of Ogoni land.  
February 15-16: Shell International advisors meet with the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company (SPDC) in London and the Hague to consider strategies for countering the "possibility 
that internationally organized protest could develop" over Shell's activities in Ogoni. 
April 18: Ken Saro-Wiwa, chairman of the resistance group "Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni People (MOSOP)," is held by the Nigerian State Security Service at Port Harcourt Airport 
for 16 hours without charges, is released, but then arrested 5 days later. 
April 30: Construction work on Shell's Rumuekpe-Bomu Pipeline destroys freshly planted Ogoni 
farmland sparking a peaceful demonstration of approximately 10,000 Ogoni villagers. Nigerian 
Federal government soldiers open fire on the crowd of demonstrators, wounding at least 10. 
May 1: Mass demonstrations along Bori Road against the pipeline construction continue. Shell 
decides to withdraw American workers and equipment. 
May 3: Agbarator Otu is shot and killed by members of the Nigerian military while protesting 
work on the pipeline at Nonwa. 
May 16: Mr. Saro-Wiwa has his passport seized while trying to leave for London. 
May 19: Amnesty International issues an Urgent Action concerning the extra-judicial killing of 
Mr. Otu and the Nigerian government's use of force against peaceful Ogoni protests. 
May 24: Mr. Saro-Wiwa begins a European tour and succeeds in drawing attention to the struggle 
of the Ogoni people. 
June 12: Presidential elections are boycotted by the Ogoni. A ruptured pipeline begins to spray oil 
in Bunu Tai, Ogoni land. Forty days later, the flow is yet to be stopped. Mr. Saro-Wiwa is 
prevented from travelling to the UN conference in Vienna by Nigerian SSS, and his passport is 
seized. 
June 21: Mr. Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP officials are arrested. 
June 22: Ogoni people march in Bori, in protest against MOSOP arrests. In reaction, Federal 
government soldiers are moved from Port Harcourt and stationed in Bori. Indiscriminate beatings 
and arrests of Ogoni people by 'heavy[ily] armed and unfriendly Nigerian soldiers and police' are 
frequent. 
June 30: Amnesty International issues a Fast Action concerning Mr. Saro-Wiwa. 
July 9: At least 60 Ogoni people are killed by Andoni when arriving back from the Cameroon 
Republic by boat. This 'incident' marks the beginning of Ogoni-Andoni violence. Mr. Saro-Wiwa 
is moved to a hospital and later released on bail, but charges still stand. 
August 5: Kaa is the first village attacked in the Andoni-Ogoni conflict, resulting in 33 deaths and 
8,000 refugees. Over the coming months, similar incidents occur in over 20 other villages. 
MOSOP accuses Shell of being behind the Andoni-Ogoni violence. 
August 31: MOSOP leaders are summoned to Abuja for a meeting with the Interim government, 
installed by former head of state Babangida after the annulment of the June 12 election results. 
This is the first time that the Nigerian government officially discussed the situation in Ogoniland 
with MOSOP. 
Early September: Mr. Saro-Wiwa, Senator Birabi, and representatives of the Rivers State 
Security Council visit the destroyed village of Kaa and urge Governor Ada George to take 
measures to curb Andoni-Ogoni violence. Meetings are arranged between Andoni and Ogoni 
                                                 
170 ICE Case Studies, Case Number: 64, Case Mnemonic: OGONIOIL, Case Name: “Ogoni and 
Nigeria conflict over Oil,” http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/ogonioil.htm, accessed 16 September 2010. 
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leaders and government representatives. This leads to the creation of a Peace Committee, headed 
by Professor Claude Ake. 
September 15: General Sani Abacha promises Mr. Saro-Wiwa that Federal troops will be sent to 
Ogoniland to help curb Andoni-Ogoni violence. 
October 6: A Peace Agreement is signed concerning the Ogoni-Andoni troubles, but without the 
signature of Mr. Saro-Wiwa, or the 'consultation of the communities involved.' 
October 17: An oil spill at Korokoro oil fields in Ogoni, operated by Shell. Baritonle Kpormon is 
shot dead at a checkpoint in Bori by a Federal soldier who has been sent to ensure peace at the 
Ogoni-Andoni border; however Bori is not at the border. A MOSOP Steering Committee meeting 
accepts the Peace Agreement but for two paragraphs, and calls for a Judicial Commission of 
Inquiry to be installed by the Federal government. 
October 19: Professor Ake, chairman of the Peace Conference, send a letter to Governor Ada 
George, stating that he does not agree with the Peace Agreement. According to him, it was drafted 
in haste and without proper consultation of the communities involved. 
October 23: Two fire trucks from SPDC are seized at Korokoro by local inhabitants. 
October 25: Three Ogoni men are shot at Korokoro oil fields by Federal government soldiers 
accompanying Shell workers who went back to retrieve the fire trucks. One man dies (Uebari 
Nna), and two are wounded (Pal Sunday and Mboo Ndike). 
November 17: The interim government resigns. General Abacha becomes the new Nigerian head 
of state. 
December 13: Governor Ada George is replaced by Lt. Col. Dauda Komo. Violent clashes 
between Ogoni and Okirika over crowded land at waterfronts, Port Harcourt. Over 90 people are 
reported dead, many more wounded. 
December 28: Probably to prevent the start of the Ogoni Week, MOSOP leaders Dr. Owen Wiwa 
and Ledum Mitee, a lawyer, are arrested without being charged. The Ogoni Assembly is dispersed 
by Nigerian soldiers. Lt. Col. Komo states that Ogoni Week was aborted because MOSOP didn't 





January 2: Mr. Saro-Wiwa is placed under house arrest. 
January 4: Dr. Owen Wiwa and Mr. Ledum are released and Mr. Saro- Wiwa's house arrest is 
lifted. 
January 11: A seven member Commission of Inquiry is installed by the Rivers State government 
to investigate Ogoni-Okirika clashes, and starts public sittings in Port Harcourt. 
January 20: A three-member ministerial team starts a two-day tour of Rivers State to investigate 
the hostilities between the communities there, as part of a general inquiry of community clashes. 
The Nigerian government is especially worried about troubles in oil producing areas. 
January 21: A $500 million contract is signed in Port Harcourt between Shell Nigeria and ABB 
Global Engineering UK, allowing the latter to collect gas from 10 flow stations in Rivers State. 
January 24: The three major oil companies in Port Harcourt estimate to have lost over $200 
million during 1993, due to ”unfavorable conditions in their areas of operation”' and call for 
urgent measures to combat the situation. 
Early April: A small conflict between Ogoni and Okoloma leads to serious clashes; Lt. Col. 
Komo is reported to have said that soldiers have been directed to deal with aggressive 
communities, and if necessary shoot trouble makers. Fifteen Ogoni people are arrested without 
being charged, including Dr. Owen Wiwa. 
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Table 4.   International Reaction to Ogoni Conflict171 
- Protest marches at Nigerian embassies and Shell offices all over the world. 
- Suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth of Britain (a group comprised of 
Britain and its former colonies). 
- The withdrawal of ambassadors by several countries. 
- Calls for a multilateral oil embargo and other sanctions by world leaders. 
- Plans for a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the 
executions. 
- Protest actions by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and 
environmental groups such as Greenpeace. 
- Calls by the European Union to impose economic sanctions. 
- Imposition of a ban on arms sales to Nigeria by a number of countries. 
- Protests in Nigeria by thousands of students and other individuals. 
- Under extreme pressure, the International Finance Corporation cancels a proposed 
$100 million loan and $80 million equity deal to Nigeria LNG, a company owned 
by the Nigerian government and the top oil producers in Nigeria (Shell, Elf, and 
Agip), to produce a gas plant and pipeline in the Niger delta. 
 
Table 5.   Key Militant Groups in the Niger Delta Region172 
S/No Militant Group Abbreviation Remarks 
1. Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People MOSOP Formed 1990 by late Saro-
Wiwa 
                                                 
171 ICE Case Studies, Case Number: 64, Case Mnemonic: OGONIOIL, Case Name: “Ogoni and 
Nigeria conflict over Oil,” accessed 16 September 2010, http://www1.american.edu/ted/ice/ogonioil.htm. 
172 Table compiled by author based on a combination of the following sources: Ilufoye Sarafa 
Ogundiya, "Domestic Terrorism and Security Threats in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria," Journal of 
Social Science 20 (2009), Updated. Augustine Ikelegbe, “Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta 
Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle,” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies; Sep 2001; 39, 3; Research Library Core, 444–451, Updated. 
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S/No Militant Group Abbreviation Remarks 
2. Supreme Egbesu Assembly SEA Formed 1996 
3. Chicoco Movement CMT Formed August 1997  rally at 
Aleibiri 
4. Itsekiri National Patriots INP 1997 During Ijaw/Itsekiri 
Conflicts 
5. Federated Niger Delta Ijaw Communities FENDIC Led by Oboko Bello emerged 
1998 after Ijaw/Itsekiri 
conflicts 
6. Movement For Survival of Ijaw Ethnic 
Nationality 
MOSIEN Formed 1998 
7. Niger Delta oil Producing Communities NDOPC 1998 
8. Niger Delta Volunteer Force NDVF Reformed October 1998 
(Initially formed 1966) 
9. Egbesu Boys of Africa EBA Formed December 1998, Ijaw 
Warri ethnic groups 
10. Isoko National Youth Movement INYM Formed 16 December 1998 
11. Niger Delta Volunteer Force NDVF 1998 
12. Ijaw Youth Council IYC Formed 1 January 1999 
13. Niger Delta Freedom Fighters NDFF Formed 1999 
14. Atangbala Boys TAB Formed 1999 
15. Ikwere Youth Movement IYM 1999 
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S/No Militant Group Abbreviation Remarks 
16. Urhobo Youth Movement UYOMO 1999 
17. Bayelsa Youth Federation of Nigeria BYFN 1999 
18. Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra MASSOB South East (Igbo); formed 
1973, resurfaced 1999 
19. Niger Delta Vigilante NDV Formed 2003; led by Ateke 
Tom (Ijaw); HQs in Port 
Harcourt 
20. Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force NDPVF Formed 2004; led by Mujahid 
Asari Dokubo (Ijaw) 
21. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta 
MEND Formed January 2006; alliance 
with NDPVF 
Table 6.   Civil Pressure Groups (Non Violent) in the Niger Delta173 
S/No Pressure Group Abbreviation Remarks 
1. Niger Delta Traditional Leaders Association NDTLA Formed 1960s 
2. Association of Minority Oil Producing States AMOP  
3. Common Wealth of Oil Producing Areas CWOPA  
4. Ijaw National Congress INC 1991 (Ethnic) 
5. Movement for Reparation to Ogbia MORETO Formed 1992; Oloibiri Clan of 
Ijaw Nation 
                                                 
173 Table compiled by author based on a combination of the following sources: Courson Elias, 
“Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta: Political Marginalization, Repression and Petro-
Insurgency in the Niger Delta,” Nordic Africa Institute, Discussion Paper 47, Uppsala 2009, 14, Updated. 
Augustine Ikelegbe, “Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications of 
Civil Society for a Regional Resource Struggle,” The Journal of Modern African Studies; Sep 2001; 39, 3; 
Research Library Core, 444–451, Updated. 
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S/No Pressure Group Abbreviation Remarks 
6. Delta Oil Producing Communities Association DOPCA 1993 
7. Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth 
Nigeria 
ERA 1993 (Environmental) 
8. Southern Minorities Forum SMF 1994 
9. Traditional Rulers of Oil Mineral Producing 
Communities of Nigeria 
TROPCON 1995 
10. National Human Rights Commission NHRC 1995 (Human Rights) 
11. Isoko Community Oil Producing Forum ICOPF 1997 (Ethnic) 
12. Niger Delta Elders Forum NDEF 1998 
13. Environmental Rights Action ERA 1998 (Environmental) 
14. Oil Watch Group - 1998 (Environmental) 
15. Oron National Forum ONF Formed 1998 
16. Egi Womens Movement EWM 1998 
17. Ijaw Council for Human Rights ICHR 1998 (Human Rights) 
18. Izon National Development and Welfare Association INADEWA 1998 (Ethnic) 
19. Students of Oil Mineral Producing Areas SOMPA 1998 
20. Egbema National Congress ENC 1998 (Communal) 
21. Niger Delta Human and Environmental Rescue 
Organization 
ND-HERO 1998 (Environmental/Human 
Rights) 
22. Egi Peoples Coalition EPC Formed 1999 
23. Niger Delta Women for Justice NDWJ 1999 
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S/No Pressure Group Abbreviation Remarks 
24. Directorate for Citizen’s Rights DCR 1999 
25. Ikwere Youth Convention IKYC Formed 1999 
26. Niger Delta Civil Society Coalition NDCSC 1999 
27. Niger Delta Peace Forum NDPF 1999 
28. Ijaw Elders Forum IEF 1999 (Ethnic) 
29. Bayelsa Indigenes Association BIA 1999 (Communal) 
30. Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law IHRHL 1999 (Human Rights) 
31. South – South Peoples Conference SSOPEC 2000 
32. Union of Niger Delta UND 2000 




Table 7.   Has OMPADEC Been Able to Promote Peace, Stability, and Development 
in Oil Communities174 
Yes/No 
Delta State 
Number          % 
Akwa-Ibom State 
Number          % 
Bayelsa State 
Number          % 
Total 




      19               26.4 
      53               73.6 
      72               100 
           7                  14.9 
           40                 85.1 
           47                 100 
          3               4.5 
          64             95.5 
          67             100 
     29      15.6 
     157    84.4 
    186    100.0 
 
 
                                                 
174 Charles Ukeje, Adetanwa Odebiyi, Amadu Sessay, Olabisi Aina, “Oil and Violent Conflicts in the 
Niger Delta,” Center for Development and Conflict Management Studies, Ile-Ife Nigeria, Obafemi 
Awolowo University Press (2002), 33. 
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APPENDIX B 
Table 8.   Selected Cases of Abductions/Kidnapping for Ransom (2002–2003)175 








 Oil Servicing 
Company/Shell 
Contractor 










 State government 
intervention-release of 





Staff (9) and 
Military 













Release after 2 days after 













demand  State intervention 
Kidnapping of 




















                                                 
175 Augustine Ikelegbe, 2005, “The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of 
Nigeria”, Nordic Journal of African studies 14(2):208–234 and the NNPC Annual Statistical Bulletin 
2007/Anyakwee Nsirimovu, 2009. 
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Table 9.   Delta Violations and Reaction of the Government and that of Affected 
Communities176 
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Table 10.   Chronology of Attacks (2006–2008)177 
 
January 10, 2006: Militants kidnap 4 foreign oil workers from Shell's offshore E.A. oilfield. 
Shell shuts 115,000 bpd E.A. platform. They also blow up crude oil pipelines, cutting supplies 
to Forcados export terminal by 100,000 bpd. 
 
January 30, 2006: Militants free all hostages kidnapped January 10, but threaten wave of 
new attacks. 
  
February 18, 2006: Militants attack a barge operated by US oil services company Willbros in 
speedboats and abduct 9 oil workers. The militants also blow up a Shell crude oil pipeline and 
a gas pipeline operated by Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation(NNPC), and bomb 
                                                 
176 Ojakorotu Victor, “Militancy and Oil Violence in the Niger Delta,” Journal of Energy and 
Security, Thursday, 27 August 2009, accessed 5 July 2010,  htt:// 
www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=211. 
177 Nigeri/ Africa Master Web News Report, “Chronology of Nigerian Militants’ Attacks,” 
http://www. africamasterweb.com/AdSense/NigerianMilitants07Chronology.html, accessed 28 September 
2010. 
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Shell's Forcados tanker loading platform, forcing the company to suspend exports from the 
380,000 bpd facility. Closure of Forcados affects other companies, cutting further 100,000 
bpd output. Shell shuts 115,000 bpd E.A. platform as precaution.  
 
March 1, 2006: Militants release 6 of the hostages kidnapped February 18; they include 1 
American, 2 Egyptians, 2 Thais and a Filipino.  
 
March 18, 2006: Militants blow up oil pipeline operated by Italian oil company Agip, 
shutting down 75,000 bpd. 
  
March 27, 2006: Militants release remaining three hostages kidnapped February 18 - 2 
Americans and a Briton.  
 
May 10, 2006: An oil executive of Baker Hughes(an American Co.) employee is killed by 
unidentified gunmen in Port Harcourt. MEND denies responsibility.  
 
May 11, 2006: 3 workers of Italian oil contractor Saipem are kidnapped.  
 
June 2, 2006: 6 Britons, 1 Canadian and an American are abducted from Bulford Dolphin oil 
rig owned by Norwegian oilfield services group Fred. Olsen Energy. Hostages are released 
two days later.  
 
June 7, 2006: Militants attack a Shell-operated natural gas facility in the Niger Delta, killing 
6 soldiers and kidnapping 5 South Korean contractors.  
 
June 20, 2006: 2 Filipinos with Beaufort International kidnapped in Port Harcourt and freed 5 
days later.  
 
July 6, 2006: Gunmen kidnap Michael Los, a Dutch oil worker in Bayelsa State. He is 
released 4 days later.  
 
July 25, 2006: Niger Delta mob seize Agip Ogbainbiri flow station, taking 24 workers 
hostage. Hostages released and flow station abandoned July 31 after paid-off by Nigerian 
government.  
 
August 3, 2006: German oil worker, Guido Schiffarth, a 62-year-old employee of Bilfinger 
and Berger snatched from his car in Port Harcourt by armed men dressed as soldiers. .  
 
August 4, 2006: Gunmen abduct 3 Filipino oil workers from a bus near Port Harcourt. They 
are released 10 days later.  
 
August 9, 2006: 2 Norwegian and 2 Ukrainian oil workers kidnapped.  
 
August 10, 2006: A Belgian and Moroccan contractors kidnapped in Port Harcourt. Both 
released on August 14.  
 
August 13, 2006: 5 foreign oil workers( 2 Britons, a German, an Irish and a Pole. ) kidnapped 
from a nightclub in Port Harcourt. An American also kidnapped earlier the same day.  
 
August 15, 2006: 2 Norwegian and 2 Ukrainian oil workers kidnapped on August 9 freed.  
 84
August 16, 2006: Lebanese man kidnapped.  
 
August 19, 2006: German oil worker, Guido Schiffarth is released. Nigerian army launch 
crackdown on militants. Soldiers fired in the air, sending men and women screaming through 
the streets of Port Harcourt.  
August 24: An Italian oil worker employed by Saipem is kidnapped by gunmen in Port 
Harcourt. He is freed after five days.  
 
October 2, 2006: 25 Nigerian employees of a Royal Dutch Shell contractor seized after an 
ambush of boats carrying supplies to Shell facilities in the Cawthorne Channel. They are 
relased two days later.  
 
October 3, 2006: 7 foreign oil workers( four Britons, one Indonesian, one Malaysian and a 
Romanian ) kidnapped in a raid on a compound for expatriate contractors working for Exxon 
Mobil. The 3 British among the released 7 foreign oil workers arrived back in Scotland 
October 23, to tell of their hostage ordeal in the hands of Nigerian delta militants. One of the 
men, Graeme Buchan, revealed how he was beaten and forced to call the chief executive of 
his employers to falsely say that his colleague Paul Smith was dead. Speaking on behalf of his 
colleagues, Mr Buchan described how they were beaten with sticks, slapped with machetes 
and feared they might never see their families again.  
 
October 21, 2006: 7 foreign oil workers kidnapped October 3 are released.  
 
November 2, 2006: A British and an American employees of Petroleum Geo-Services(PGS) 
are kidnapped from a survey ship off the coast of Bayelsa.  
 
November 7, 2006: British and American employees of Petroleum Geo-Services(PGS) 
kidnapped on November 2 freed.  
 
November 22, 2006: A British oil worker is killed during an attempt by Nigerian soldiers to 
free 7 hostages abducted by militants earlier the same day.  
 
December 7, 2006: Gunmen kidnap three Italians and one Lebanese from a residential 
facility. Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) claims responsibility.  
 
December 14, 2006: Gunmen invade the Nun River logistics base in Bayelsa State operated 
by Royal Dutch Shell and hold 5 people hostage.  
 
December 18, 2006: 2 car bombs explode in Port Harcourt, one near Agip compound and the 
other in Shell residential compound. There were no casualties.  
 
December 21, 2006: Militants storm the Obagi field facility in Rivers State, operated by 
Total, killing 3 people.  
 
January 5, 2007: Gunmen kidnapped 5 Chinese telecom workers. Militants plant a car bomb 
in the Shell residential compound in Port Harcourt. Shell evacuates some staff from 
compounds in Port Harcourt, Bonny Island and Warri.  
 
January 10, 2007: Gunmen attacked a base operated by South Korea's Daewoo Engineering 




January 12, 2007: 9 South Korean workers and one Nigerian are freed after being kidnapped 
when gunmen attacked a base operated by South Korea's Daewoo Engineering and 
Construction in the Bayelsa state capital Yenagoa on Jan. 10.  
 
January 16, 2007: 3 people including a Dutch oil worker are killed when their boat, operated 
by South Korean firm Hyundai, was attacked by gunmen on its way to the Bonny Island 
export terminal.  
January 18, 2007: Gunmen free 5 Chinese telecom workers, kidnapped January 5. An Italian 
is also released in Bayelsa state. 3 foreign hostages remain in captivity.  
 
January 20, 2007: Militants seize German shipping line Baco-Liner cargo ship on its way to 
Warri port taking all 24 Filipino crew members hostage.  
 
January 23, 2007: Gunmen kidnap 2 engineers, an American and a Briton, in Port Harcourt, 
on their way to work.  
 
January 25, 2007: 9 employees of Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) working in 
Bayelsa state under contract with Shell are kidnapped.  
 
February 4, 2007: 9 employees of Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) kidnapped 
on January 25 released.  
 
February 6, 2007: Gunmen kidnap a Filipino oil worker on Port Harcourt - Owerri road.  
 
February 7, 2007: A Filipina woman is kidnapped by gunmen in Port Harcourt. This 
apparently is the first abduction of a woman in the region. The same day, a French oil worker( 
an employee of Total Oil Co ), identified as Gerard Laporal, married to a Nigerian woman is 
kidnapped by gunmen as he returned home around 9:00 pm.  
 
February 13, 2007: Militants release 24 Filipinos kidnapped on January 20.  
 
February 17, 2007: 4 young Nigerian men serving as missionaries for The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints abducted from their apartment in Port Harcourt.  
 
February 18, 2007: 3 Croatian oil workers of Hydrodrive Nigeria abducted in Port Harcourt.  
 
March 4, 2007: Gunmen kidnap a German construction worker and killed a soldier in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
March 14, 2007: Militants release 2 Italian workers Being held since December 7.  
 
March 23, 2007: A Dutch manager for German building contractor Bilfinger Berger, 
kidnapped in Port Harcourt.  
 
March 31, 2007: A British worker abducted from the Bulford Dolphin oil rig.  
 




April 4, 2007: Dutch manager kidnapped on March 23 is released. British worker abducted on 
March 31released and 2 Lebanese employed by Setraco abducted on April 2 also released.  
 
April 7, 2007: Gunmen kidnap 2 Turkish engineers from their car in Port Harcourt.  
 
April 27, 2007: Gunmen kill 2 policemen in a failed kidnap attempt in Port Harcourt as the 
officers were escorting a convoy of vehicles carrying expatriate staff to work.  
 
May 1, 2007: An American, 4 Italians and a Croat are kidnapped from an offshore oil facility 
operated by Chevron in Bayelsa State.  
May 3, 2007: Gunmen kidnap 20 foreign workers in three attacks, but eight are freed within 
hours. Saipem reduces output by about 50,000 barrels a day.  
 
May 5, 2007: Gunmen abduct a British oil worker from Trident 8 rig operated by U.S.-based 
Transocean off the coast of Bayelsa. In a separate incident, gunmen abduct a Belarusian 
woman who works as a manager of Britain's Compass Group from outside her home in Port 
Harcourt.  
 
May 8, 2007: 3 South Koreans and 8 Filipinos are freed after being held for five days. Rebels 
blow up three oil pipelines in the Niger Delta, forcing Italian oil giant Eni to halt production 
of 150,000 barrels per day feeding its Brass export terminal. MEND claims responsibility for 
the attack.  
 
May 9, 2007: Gunmen kidnap 4 U.S. oil workers from a barge off the coast near Chevron's 
Escravos crude export terminal.  
 
May 16, 2007: Belarusian woman abducted May 5, is freed.  
 
May 19, 2007: 2 Indian staff of Eleme Petrochemical Company are kidnapped by gunmen in 
Port Harcourt.  
 
May 22, 2007: In Warri Gunmen abduct a Lebanese man, Financial Controller at oil service 
company Nigercat in the city.  
 
May 24, 2007: Gunmen kidnap a Polish engineer near Warri.  
 
May 25, 2007: Nine( 3 Americans, 4 Britons, a South African, and a Filipino ) oil workers are 
kidnapped from a ship in the Niger Delta.  
 
May 28, 2007: Polish engineer kidnapped May 24 is released.  
 
May 30, 2007: 4 U.S. oil workers, kidnapped May 9 are released.  
 
June 1, 2007: Gunmen kidnap 3 senior managers of Indonesian chemical company Indorama 
from their residential estate in Port Harcourt. In a separate incident, gunmen kidnap 4 workers 
from Britain, France, Netherlands and Pakistan from their residential compound of oil 
services company Schlumberger in Port Harcourt. Yet another raid by gunmen took 10 Indian 
hostages.  
 
June 2, 2007: An American, 4 Italians and a Croat kidnapped May 1, are released.  
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June 3, 2007: Gunmen kidnap 6 staff of United Company RUSAL (Russian aluminum giant 
), in Ikot Abasi in the Niger Delta.  
 
June 11, 2007: 5 Britons and 3 Americans are released in Bayelsa State. 2 Indians, a Filipino 
and a South African kidnapped May 25, all released.  
 
June 15, 2007: Gunmen kidnap 2 Lebanese men, employees of Italian firm Stabilini, in Ogara 
in Delta State. In a separate incident in Delta State also, gunmen kidnap 2 Indian construction 
workers.  
 
June 16, 2007: Militants release 10 Indian hostages held since June 1.  
 
June 21, 2007: Troops kill 12 militants and free some hostages in a dawn raid on an Italian-
operated Ogbainbiri oil facility.  
 
June 23, 2007: 4 foreign hostages employed by oil services giant Schlumberger kidnapped 
June 1 are released unharmed.  
 
July 5, 2007: Margaret Hill, a 3-year-old British girl is abducted in Port Harcourt. She is 
released July 8.  
 
July 7, 2007: Royal Dutch Shell reports one of its teams attacked in Rivers State, 2 Nigerian 
workers taken hostage. The 2 Nigerians released July 11.  
 
July 8, 2007: A Bulgarian and a Briton, employees of British oil company Exprogroup 
kidnapped from a barge near Calabar in Cross River state. They were freed August 8, 2007.  
 
July 12, 2007: Francis Samuel Amadi, 3-year-old son of a traditional ruler of Iriebe is 
kidnapped in Port Harcourt. He was released next day.  
 
July 31, 2007: A Pakistani construction manager with Gitto, an Italian firm is kidnapped near 
Bodo in the Ogoni area of Rivers State.  
 
August 10, 2007: Gunmen abducts David Ward, a British manager from oil services firm 
Hydrodive in Port Harcourt.  
 
August 28, 2007: Pakistani construction manager kidnapped on July 31 is released.  
 
September 23, 2007: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) announces 
will restart attacks on oil installations and abduction of expatriates following the arrest of its 
leader, Henry Okah on arms trafficking on September 3.  
 
September 27, 2007: Gunmen raid oil services company Saipem and abduct a Colombian and 
a Filipino workers of the company, killing another Colombian staff.  
 
October 5, 2007: David Ward, abducted by gunmen August 10, is freed by Nigerian troops.  
 
October 10, 2007: The two Colombian and Filipino workers of oil services company Saipem 
abducted September 27, are both released.  
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October 20, 2007: Seven workers, 4 Nigerians and 3 contractors of Royal Dutch Shell( a 
Russian, a Briton, & a Croat ) are seized at EA field off the coast of Bayelsa State by gunmen 
in speedboats. All are freed October 22.  
 
October 26, 2007: Gunmen in speedboats attack the Mystras vessel at an offshore oil 
production facility operated by Saipem, seizing six Indian and Polish oil workers hostage. 
MEND had claims responsibility for the attack.  
 
October 30, 2007: Six Indian and Polish hostages seized October 26 are all freed.  
March 4, 2008: A German employee of German-Nigerian construction group Julius Berger 
kidnapped in Port Harcourt.  
 
May 23, 2008: 2 foreign workers( a Pakistani & a Maltese ) are kidnapped at Omoku village 
of the Niger Delta.  
 
June 3, 2008: Gunmen abduct 2 Lebanese employees of Setraco, a local engineering 
company in the town of Amassoma of the Niger Delta.  
 
June 19, 2008: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) attack Royal 
Dutch Shell's Bonga oilfield , taking Jack Stone, the U.S. captain of a nearby supply ship 
hostage. Stone was released later same day. ''Capt. J. (Jack) Stone, who was captured by our 
fighters in the early hours of today (Thursday), was released unconditionally to his employers 
by 1645Hrs,'' a terse statement from MEND stated. The rebels warn of further attacks.  
 
June 22, 2008: MEND declares ceasefire from attacks following appeal for peace by Niger 
Delta elders. The group in an electronic email, entitled, “Unilateral Ceasefire”:, signed by 
Jomo Gbomo said, “Effective 12 midnight on Tuesday, June 24, 2008, the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) will be observing a unilateral ceasefire in the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria until further notice.”  
 
June 22 & 23, 2008: Rival Militants In Gun Battle In Bayelsa - Fierce gun battle between 
militia groups loyal to the peace pact initiated in the state and those against the process. 2 
killed in the fight. Fighting erupted when the later, the Niger Delta Vigilante Force (NDVF) 
led by warlord Ateke Tom attempted to set up a camp in Opuama in the Southern Ijaw council 
area. The NDVF was formerly based in Okirika but got chased out recently through the 
combined efforts of the Rivers State Government and the Joint Military Task Force. It 
therefore decided to set up another camp in Opuama in Bayelsa. A militant commander in the 
area popularly known as Prince Igodo vehemently resisted the moves, arguing it would 
threaten the peace initiative in the area. Prince Igodo is a leading member of the peace pact 
between Bayelsa State Government and 14 commanders of militant camps in the state. 
Attempt by NDVF to go ahead with its plan led to fierce fighting involving the use of 
sophisticated weapons by both sides.  
 
June 24, 2008: Death toll from fighting between NDVF militants and Prince Igodo's group 
put at 20.  
 
June 25, 2008: Militants in the Niger Delta call off their unilateral ceasefire and order 
resumed hostilities. The Joint Revolutionary Council (JRC), comprising Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the Reformed Niger Delta People's Volunteer 
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Force and the Martyrs Brigade, announced the ceasefire call off in a press statement signed by 
its spokesperson, Cynthia Whyte.  
 
June 27, 2008: Ateke Tom led NDVF militants capture rival militant warlord. Prince Igodo. 
His two hands are cut-off and he bleeds to death according to reports. In an unrelated incident, 
gunmen storm a burial function whisking away Mr. Ekpareba Apiri, a permanent secretary 
with Bayelsa State oil service, as he hosted guests after his relative's interment in their country 
home of Okodi in Ogbia local government area. Apiri's corpse was dumped at his doorstep the 
following morning.  
 
July 11, 2008: 2 German employees of construction firm Julius Berger, Nigerian unit of 
Germany's Bilfinger Berger kidnapped at Emohua in Rivers state.  
 
July 16, 2008: Thousands of Nigerians flee Niger Delta oil town of Bonny after militants 
threaten to behead people who are not originally from the area.  
 
Table 11.   Timeline of Recent Unrest in Niger Delta Region178 
February 2010  
On 2 February Minister of Defence Maj Gen Godwin Abe calls on the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) group to respect the ceasefire members had declared 
on 25 October 2009 but ended three months later.  
 
January 2010  
On 30 January MEND calls off its declared ceasefire threatening an "all-out onslaught" on the oil 
industry in the Niger Delta oil-producing region and warning of attacks in the weeks to come.  
Three British workers and one Colombian are released on 18 January, six days after they were 
abducted by unknown gunmen near the main oil city of Port Harcourt in the Niger Delta.  
 
December 2009  
MEND delivers what it calls a "warning" strike by destroying a major crude pipeline in the Niger 
Delta on 19 December.  
The group expresses frustration over stalled peace talks due to the absence of ailing President 
Umaru Yar'Adua. "A situation where the future of the Niger Delta is tied to the health and well-
being of one man is unacceptable," MEND says in a statement.  
 
November 2009  
On 15 November top Nigerian officials meet with MEND leaders in the capital, Abuja, to discuss 
plans for development of the oil-producing region as part of a drive to end the long-running 
insurgency.  
 
October 2009  
On 25 October MEND reinstates an indefinite ceasefire raising prospects for peace in the troubled 
oil-producing region after nearly three decades of hostilities.  
President Umaru Yar'Adua meets for the first time with the leader of MEND, Henry Okah, in 
                                                 
178 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Integrated Regional 
Information Networks Abuja 4 February 2010, (IRIN), Relief Web, accessed September 28, 2010, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900, SID/MUMA-82D2AY?OpenDocument. 
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Abuja to diffuse tensions in the Niger Delta on 19 October. The government announces a 
US$1.3-billion development package to build roads, schools and hospitals in the Niger Delta.  
A government amnesty for militants expires on 4 October. Between August and October between 
8,000 and 15,000 gunmen have handed in thousands of weapons and renounced violence under 
the amnesty program, according to the authorities.  
 
September 2009  
On 29 September MEND names a team of negotiators that included Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka 
for talks with government.  
On 15 September MEND extends a two-month ceasefire in the oil-producing region by 30 days, 
but dismisses as a sham the government's amnesty program.  
 
August 2009  
The government's 60-day amnesty program for the Niger Delta comes into effect. Under the 
initiative militants who surrender their weapons within the period are to receive training, 
employment assistance and a government pardon.  
The government announces it will give 10 percent of Nigeria's joint oil ventures to Niger Delta 
residents.  
 
July 2009  
On 15 July MEND announces a unilateral 60-day ceasefire and releases six crew members it had 
seized from a foreign oil tanker 'Sichem Peace'.  
On 12 July the federal government drops all charges against the leader of MEND, Henry Okah, 
and releases him from jail. He was on trial for treason and gun-running. On the same day MEND 
commits a rare raid on an oil offloading facility in Lagos, the group's first attack outside the Niger 
Delta in several months. Five people are killed in the attack.  
 
June 2009  
On 26 June President Umaru Yar'Adua formally announces details of an amnesty program for 
militants in the Niger Delta. MEND rejects the plans by the government and vows to continue 
attacks on the oil industry until the "injustice" to the oil-rich region is corrected. At least six high-
profile attacks on oil well heads, offshore platforms, major pipelines and oil pumping stations are 
reported in the days following declaration. The group claims at least 20 soldiers were killed in 
one of the attacks on Shell's Forcados offshore platform in Delta state. Chevron evacuates 
hundreds of workers from the Niger Delta after the attacks.  
Royal Dutch Shell reaches an out-of-court settlement on 8 June with the Ogoni community in 
eastern Niger Delta to pay compensation for complicity in the execution of writer Ken Saro-
Wiwa and eight other leaders of the Ogoni tribe.  
 
May 2009  
On 25 May Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) says it has destroyed 
several oil pipelines which oil company Chevron confirms has cut its production by 100,000 
barrels per day.  
Clashes between government forces (the Joint Task Force) and militants break out on 12 May. 
Both sides deny initiating the attack. On 14 May militants take at least 15 hostages; the JTF 
launched a major offensive “Operation Restore Hope” destroyed several insurgent camps and
 
 eventually frees most of the hostages. Rebel leader Tom Polo's compound is destroyed but he is 
still said to be at large. Thousands of Niger Delta residents are displaced in the fighting.  
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March 2009  
President Umaru Yar'Adua declares the government will consider a conditional amnesty for 
militants in the Niger Delta.  
 
February 2009  
Joint Task Force destroys prominent 'Daroama militants' camp in Bayelsa state.  
President Yar'Adua announces the creation of a new government committee to study 
recommendations of previous Technical Committee set up in September 2008 to recommend 
solutions for reducing violence in region.  
Militants attack a civilian helicopter for first time.  
 
January 2009  
Militants call off unilateral ceasefire announced in September 2008, declaring "Hurricane 
Obama" step-up in attacks, linked to a government offensive on camp of rebel member Ateke 
Tom.  
Civil society group coalition criticizes President Yar'Adua's silence on Technical Committee 
recommendations for reducing violence.  
 
December 2008  
Government forces arrest militant leader Sabomabo Jackrich.  
Government Technical Committee issues recommendations to reduce violence in Niger Delta 
including appointing a mediator to facilitate discussions between government and militants; 
granting amnesty to some militant leaders; launching a disarmament, demobilisation and 
rehabilitation campaign; and channeling 25 percent of the country's oil revenue to the Delta, up 
from the current 13 percent.  
 
November 2008  
Military launches crackdown on oil thieves.  
 
September 2008  
Militants declare an “oil war” in which they step up attacks on oil facilities and security forces, 
sparking the heaviest clashes in the region in two years. On 13 September, government security 
forces allegedly raze three villages in Rivers state in search of MEND member Farah Dagogo. 
Dozens die in attacks, according to International Crisis Group.  
Militants take 27 oil workers hostage, later releasing all but two.  
On 10 September 2008, Nigerian cabinet appoints a new minister for the region, the Minister of 
Niger Delta Affairs, Obong Ufot Ekaette. Government forms Technical Committee to 
recommend ways to reduce violence in the Delta.  
At end of month militants declare unilateral ceasefire.  
 
June 2008  




February 2008  
Prominent militant, Henry Okah, arrested in Angola and is extradited to Nigeria.  
 
November 2007  
Militants step up oil pipeline attacks.  
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August 2007  
Government troops continue sweep of restive main oil city of Port Harcourt.  
 
May 2007  
President Yar'Adua assumes office. Four American oil workers held by militants for weeks 
released.  
 
December 2006  
Criminal gangs release more than 20 hostages seized some 20 days prior.  
 
December 2006  
Three Italian oil workers seized.  
 
November 2006  
Soldiers and militants clash in Bayelsa state and at least two militants die in the shootout.  
 
October 2006 to June 2007  
Kidnapping of oil workers intensifies.  
 
October 2006  
Hundreds of villagers occupy four oil pumping stations in the Niger Delta saying oil company 
Shell reneged on a promise to give supply contracts to the host community.  
 
October 2006  
Army confirmed the killing of nine soldiers in a clash with militants.  
 
September 2006  
Soldiers invade Okochiri village, near the main oil city of Port Harcourt, said to be a hideout for 
suspected kidnappers of oil workers.  
 
September 2006  
Oil unions launch a three-day strike over deteriorating security situation in the Niger Delta.  
 
May 2006  
A Nigerian court orders oil company Shell Petroleum Development Corporation to pay $1.5 
billion in damages to a host community in the Niger Delta for years of environmental pollution. 
Shell files an appeal and refuses to accept the judgment.  
 
April 2006  
President Olusegun Obasanjo inaugurates a forum of Delta activists, elders, officials and youth 
leaders in bid to end the crisis.  
 
February 2006  
The first high-profile seizure of oil workers occurs. Militants of the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a group representing numerous militant factions, 

































2000 28.49 140,000 1.5 
billion 
250,000 $2.6 billion 390,000 4.1 billion 
2001 24.50 724,171 6.5 
billion 
200,000 $1.8 billion 924,171 8.3 billion 
2002 25.15 699,763 6.5 
billion 
370,000 $3.4 billion 1,069,763 9.9 billion 
2003 28.76 300,000 $3.2 
billion 
350,000 $3.7 billion 650,000 $6.9 billion 
2004 38.27 300,000 $4.2 
billion 
230,000 $3.2 billion 530,000 $6.4 billion 
2005 55.67 250,000 $5.1 
billion 
180,000 $3.7 billion 430,000 $8.8 billion 












                                                 
179 Table compiled by author based on a combination of the following sources: Stephen Davis, “The 
Opportunity for Peace in the Niger Delta,” GEEI Green Paper Series, No.2 Summer 2009, accessed July 4, 
2010, http://www.sais-jhu.edu/centers/geei/Papers/The_Opportunity_for_Peace_in_the_Niger_Delta.pdf, 6; 
“The Potential for Peace and Reconciliation in the Niger Delta,” Coventry Cathedral, February 2009, 




































Table 13.   Approved Nomination List for National Political Reform Conference180 
 Group 
S/N 
Title Number Comment 
1 Chairman        1 } All of 
2 Deputy Chairman   1 } these  46 
3 Respectable Elder Statesmen (1 per State)              36 } to be 
4 Retired Military Personnel  2 } nominated
5 Police    2 } by 
6 Civil Servants    2 } the 
7 Diplomats    2 }President 
8 State Representatives (6 per State & 2 from FCT)  218  
9 Traditional Rulers (1 per Zone)  6  
10 Academicians (1 per Zone)   6  
11 Labour   6  
12 Nigeria Employers Consultative Association 
(NECA)     
4  
13 Nigeria Youth Organisations  4  
14 Women Groups  8  
15 Manufacturers Association  of Nigeria (MAN)  4  
16 National Association of Chambers of Commerce, 
Industry,  Manufacturing and Agriculture 
(NACCIMA)            
4  
17 Political Parties:    
                                                 
180 Mobolaji E. Aluko, “The NPRC and the PNC- Thoughts on the Opposing National Conferences,” 
Burtonsville, MD, USA 29 January 2005, DAWODU.COM, accessed 25 September 2010, 
http://www.dawodu.com/aluko108.htm. 
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18 PDP 12  
19 ANPP  4  
20 AD  2  
21 Others  2  
22 Civil Societies (Not on Zonal basis)   6  
23 Moslem Leaders  6  
24 Christian Leaders   6  
25 National Association of  Nigerian Students (NANS)  2  
26 Media   2  
27 Physically-Challenged People  2  
28 Nigerians in Diaspora (1 each  Europe, America, Asia 
and Africa)  
4  
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